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he most significant problem facing corporate America today is the
management-dominated, passive board of directors. A common
occurrence in many of our largest corporations is that passive
boards are responsible for excessive executive compensation and, more
importantly, poor corporate performance.' The board, created to moni-
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1. The following Article draws from and expands upon two earlier works that both
examined the negative impact on corporate performance resulting from passive boards of
directors and offered an equity-based solution to create more active board oversight and
greater corporate performance. See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation,
and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 649 (1995) [hereinafter Elson, Duty of Care].
This article examined the relation between a passive board of directors and the director's
legal duty of care. It suggested that the duty in its present form enhances board passivity
and why substantial director stock ownership will counter that passivity. Id. at 691. To
achieve high levels of director equity ownership, it suggested compensating directors with
stock and presented an empirical study to support its conclusions. Id. at 700-06. See
Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv.
937 (1993) [hereinafter Elson, Board-Based Solution]. This article examined the history of
the executive overcompensation problem and critiqued as either ineffective or harmful to
corporate well-being, the solutions offered by other commentators, including heightened
disclosure, tax-based remedies, judicial involvement, institutional shareholder activism,
strengthened board compensation committees, and a market-based approach. Based on an
empirical study of the executive compensation voting behavior of boards composed of
outside directors with substantial stockholdings, Board-Based Solution suggested that a
link exists between heightened equity ownership and more effective compensation over-
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tor management in order to ensure effective decision-making, has
evolved into a body that, in its most extreme form, simply "rubber
stamps" executive prerogative. Management, no longer checked, freely
engages in conduct that is slothful, ill-directed, or self-dealing-all to the
corporation's detriment. Shareholders, mindful of recent disasters at
General Motors, IBM, American Express, Archer-Daniels-Midland,
W.R. Grace, and Morrison Knudsen, are keenly aware of this problem. 2
sight. Id. at 990-95. See Dennis C. Carey et al., How Should Directors Be Compensated?,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Special Report No. 1, 1996, at 1; Charles M. Elson, Shareholding
Directors Create Better Corporate Performance, ISSUE ALERT, May 1996, at 3; Charles M.
Elson, Shareholding Directors Create Better Corporate Performance, in DIRECTORSHIP-
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES FACING DIRECTORS 7-1 (1996) [hereinafter Elson, Shareholding Di-
rectors Create Better Corporate Performance]; Charles M. Elson, Major Shifts Seen in Di-
rector Pay, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May-June 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Elson, Major
Shifts Seen in Director Pay]; Charles M. Elson, The Director as Employee of Management,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1996, at 34 [hereinafter Elson, The Director as Employee
of Management]; Charles M. Elson, Shareholding Non-Executives Should Limit Excessive
Directors' Pay, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at A2 [hereinafter Elson, Shareholding Non-Exec-
utives Should Limit Excessive Directors' Pay]; Charles M. Elson, Manager's Journal Board
Pay Affects Executive Pay, CORP. BOARD, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 7 [hereinafter Elson, Board
Pay Affects Executive Pay]; Charles M. Elson, Manager's Journal: A Board-Based Solution
to Overpaid CEOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1993, at A22 [hereinafter Elson, A Board-Based
Solution to Overpaid CEOs]; Charles M. Elson, Director-Owners Can Lower High Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at F15 [hereinafter Elson, Director-Owners Can Lower High
Pay].
2. The effects of a derelict board are evidenced by the recent fortunes at a number of
well-known American companies. The recent turmoil at General Motors, IBM, American
Express, Archer-Daniels-Midland, W.R. Grace, and Morrison Knudsen demonstrates the
consequences of an inattentive board. Throughout its history, the GM Board was typically
beholden to GM management with board meetings being little more than social gatherings
in which the CEO's agenda was approved. After a long, steady decline during which GM's
share of the American car market dropped from 52% to 35%, the GM Board finally took
affirmative steps to improve the company's performance, including firing GM's CEO Rob-
ert Stempel. See John Greenwald, What Went Wrong?, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 42, 44; see
also Dana W. Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, FORBES, May 22, 1995, at 168 [hereinaf-
ter Linden et al., The Cosseted Director]; Kathleen Day, GM's Move Symbolizes Wider
Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al (noting that "boards typically have been captive to
the wishes of the company chairman," but that pressure has been mounting on the boards
to assume a more proactive stance in the fulfillment of their duties).
In January 1993, IBM CEO John Akers was forced to resign amid sagging profits and
lost market share. Preceding this resignation, IBM saw its worldwide market share drop
from 30% in 1985 to 19% in 1991, its stock price lose half its value over a six-month period,
was forced to make a 55% cut in its quarterly dividend, and recorded a $4.97 billion loss in
1992. Carol J. Loomis, King John Wears an Uneasy Crown, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 44;
Michael W. Miller & Laurence Hooper, Signing Off. Akers Quits at IBM Under Heavy
Pressure; Dividend Is Slashed; Outsiders Will Lead Search for New Chief Executive to Be a
"Change-master," WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1993, at Al.
Similarly, American Express board members dissatisfied with the company's recent fi-
nancial performance and public relation gaffes deposed CEO James D. Robinson, III. Bill
Saporito, The Toppling of King James, III, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 42-43. Robinson,
who served as CEO for 16 years, developed American Express into a "financial services
supermarket." Id. at 42. However, the number of American Express cardholders was
down worldwide, earnings were lackluster as a result of a $112 million charge at Optima,
and its stock price remained depressed. Id. at 43.
Following a shareholder revolt resulting from damaging disclosures relating to a federal
antitrust investigation of the company, the Archer-Daniels-Midland board of directors in
October 1995 announced that it would form a corporate governance committee consisting
of several present board members to recommend possible changes in board structure. An-
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But is there a solution?
Corporate governance scholars have debated potential solutions for
years. Numerous legal reforms have been proposed, often involving such
acts as the creation of the professional "independent" director,3 the de-
gry institutional shareholders had withheld their votes for reelecting the board-resulting
in board members being reelected with only 80% of the total vote. Kurt Eichenwald,
Cheers, and Boos, at Archer-Daniels Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at D2; Joann S.
Lublin, Is ADM's Board Too Big, Cozy and Well Paid?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at B1.
See Kurt Eichenwald, A Shareholder Rebellion: Investors Demand Answers from Archer-
Daniels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at D1; Archer-Daniels Faces Informal SEC Inquiry into
Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1995, at C18; Thomas M. Burton & Richard Gibson,
ADM Director Ross Johnson Spouts Off on FBI Inquiry, Whitacre and Forgery, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 12, 1995, at A4.
The governance committee recommended that the size of the board be reduced from its
current size of 17 members to between 9-15 members and that a majority of the board
members be outside directors. The committee defined an outside director as someone
"who is not a current or former Archer-Daniels executive, has no material business or
professional relationship with the company, has no close family relationship with the com-
pany's management and is not receiving compensation from the company other than as a
director." Kurt Eichenwald, Shift by Company Will Bring in More Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1996, at D1. The committee also proposed a mandatory age 70 board retirement
policy. Id. Additionally, the committee recommended that the directors' pension plan be
eliminated and the board members be compensated 50% in company stock. Id.
On March 2, 1995, it was reported that J.P. Bolduc, W.R. Grace's president and CEO,
had abruptly resigned following a long dispute with the former company chairman, Peter
Grace. It had been alleged that Grace and his son had received substantial stipends from
the company in addition to their regular salaries. Grace himself, in addition to his monthly
consulting fee of $50,000, received $165,000 annually for nursing care, $200,000 for security
guards, $30,000 for a full-time cook, and $74,500 to maintain a New York apartment largely
for his family's personal use. Later, pressure from institutional shareholders forced the
company to announce substantial changes in the structure of its board, including a reduc-
tion of the board's size, an age limit of 70 for directors, and the inclusion of six new outside
directors. PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 2, 1995; PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 1995; James P. Miller et al.,
Bad Chemistry: W.R. Grace Is Roiled by Flap Over Spending and What to Disclose, De-
parted CEO Makes Issue of the Chairman's Perks, Son's Use of Grace Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 10, 1995, at Al; Joann S. Lublin, Attempts to Banish Harassment Reach into Executive
Suite, Action on Grace CEO Reflects Firms' Greater Willingness to Oust High Officials,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1995, at B4.
In 1992, Morrison Knudsen's chairman William Agee announced that he wanted to turn
the construction company into a rail-car maker. The effort initially seemed successful;
however, one year later, in July 1994, the company announced an unexpected second-quar-
ter loss of $40.5 million and disclosed delays with various construction projects as well as
with testing and delivery of new rail-cars. In early 1995, the company announced that it
expected a substantial loss for 1994, was in default on its loan agreements, and would elimi-
nate its dividend. Agee was then relieved of his duties, and it was disclosed that he had
attempted to run the Boise, Idaho-based company from his Pebble Beach, California es-
tate, flying in corporate vice presidents for weekly briefings. His 1993 compensation of
$2.4 million amounted to 6.8% of MK's net income; the $4 million spent on Mr. Agee's jet
equaled 13% of the general and administrative budget. Board resignations followed and
eventually the entire board was replaced. Morrison Knudsen Pact, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
1993, at B14; Morrison Knudsen Gets Contract, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1993, at C24; Carrie
Dolan, Morrison Knudsen Rail Plans Hurt by Unexpected Loss, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1994,
at A14; Joan E. Rigdon, William Agee Will Leave Morrison Knudsen, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,
1995, at B1; Joann S. Lublin, Five More Big Companies to Stop Giving Pensions to Outside
Members of Boards, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at A2.
3. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 883-92 (1991) (calling for institu-
tional investors to organize a core of professional directors who would sit on corporate
boards to ensure effective management); Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the
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velopment of strengthened board fiduciary duties,4 or the stimulation of
effective institutional shareholder activism.5 All, it seems, have yielded
little success because the passive board still flourishes. Yet the solution
may be simple and obvious. Just as compensation is used to motivate
employees to do their best, directors' compensation must induce directors
to think more like shareholders. A shareholding mind-set will stimulate
the outside directors to engage in the kind of active management over-
sight that so many boards now fail to exercise.
To create this perspective, companies should compensate their outside
directors primarily in company stock that is restricted as to resale during
New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1168-73 (1991) (recommending that
institutional investors sit on the corporate boards to oversee daily activity); George W.
Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 881, 896 (1989) (encouraging the use of professional directors to supervise day-to-day
operations).
4. Professor Cox has argued for the application of a stronger, more rigorous duty of
care. James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Deriva-
tive Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 762-63 (1984). Other commentators
suggested similar approaches. See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of
Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule,
62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 595 (1983) (proposing a standard of reasonable care so that "the
business judgment rule would resume its historical basis as a protection against hindsight
evaluation of erroneous decisions, but would shed its protective role as a shield for all
director action in the absence of fraud or other illegal behavior").
5. Indeed, much scholarly attention has been devoted to the "promise" of "institu-
tional investor voice." Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu-
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 816 (1992). See generally ROBERT A.G.
MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 73-79 (1991) (noting that institu-
tional investors closely monitor boards because of their desire to increase portfolio values
and avoid "liability for breach of fiduciary duty"); Barnard, supra note 3, at 1135 (examin-
ing the concept of shareholder advisory committees and the appropriate role of institu-
tional investors in corporate governance); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992) (discussing
the benefits institutional oversight could have on corporate performance); Richard M.
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
BROOK L. REV. 1 (1991) (analyzing the transnational effects of institutional investments);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control, The Institutional Investor As Corporate Moni-
tor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (discussing the efficiency and development of institu-
tional investors in the United States); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 117 (1988) (discussing the motivations of institutional
investors and the prospective consequences of investor activism); Dent, supra note 3, at
881 (analyzing the separation of ownership control and offering a solution to corporate
governance); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 863 (proposing a strategy for improving
corporate governance through increased activity on the part of the institutional investors);
Louis Lowenstein, Why Managements Should (And Should Not) Have Respect for Their
Shareholders, 17 J. CORP. L. 1 (1991) (advising corporations on the proper relationships
with shareholders); Thomas C. Paefgen, Institutional Investors Ante Portas: A Comparative
Analysis of an Emergent Force in Corporate America and Germany, 26 INT'L LAW. 327
(1992) (suggesting that long-term financial strategies of institutional investors will increase
effective board monitoring in American and German corporations); Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445
(1991) (analyzing the significance of increased shareholder activism); Robert D. Rosen-
baum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy
Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163 (1991) (addressing the underlying premise on calls for
proxy reformation). For a contrary view on the effectiveness of institutional shareholder
activism, see D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Marginal Incompetence: Les-
sons from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
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their term in office. Each director will thus possess a powerful personal
financial incentive to examine questionable management initiatives with
the vigorous, independent, and challenging eye of an owner. All other
forms of director compensation, which I believe promote board passivity
and a pro-management bias, should be discontinued in favor of this eq-
uity-based approach.
In order to understand why stock-based compensation will solve the
problem of board passivity, we must first examine its origins and the his-
tory of board compensation. This passivity problem is not a new one, but
dates back over seventy years with the rise of the large-scale public cor-
poration. Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, in their 1932 landmark
work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, were the first to
identify the force that was to lead to passive boards-the rise of manage-
ment domination of the large corporation through the separation of own-
ership from control. 6 Traditionally, corporate directors were major
shareholders and received no compensation for their services. Early cor-
porate legal doctrine clearly stated that directors were not entitled to re-
muneration for their activities as board members.7 However, with the
tremendous expansion of the American economy occurring throughout
the early part of the twentieth century, corporations became vast finan-
cial entities. With this growth in the size of the modern corporation,
shareholdings in these enterprises became proportionally smaller and
smaller, with no one shareholder or shareholding group possessing
enough stock to exercise effective control over the entity. Consequently,
professional management filled this control vacuum. Directors, rather
than being selected from among shareholder ranks, instead were nomi-
nated by management. Their connection with the enterprise generally
resulted from a prior relationship with management (in fact, many direc-
tors were themselves members of management), not the shareholding
owners, and they often had little or no shareholding stake in the com-
pany.8 However, as the shareholders' legal fiduciaries, directors were ex-
pected to expend independent time and effort in their roles, and,
consequently, it was recognized that they must now be compensated for
their activities. By the mid-1950s, the legal prohibition against director
6. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932). According to Berle and Means, the result of the wide diffusion of
ownership in the modem corporation was the birth of a class of professional managers who
controlled the corporation while owning a de minimis amount of the company's stock. Id.
at 47-68; see Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46 (stating that capitalism evolved a "market society dominated by
corporations ... with absentee owners and professional managers").
7. See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text. Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224,229-30
(Del. Cl. 1921); National Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1899);
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 1.01-.02
(1981); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 8.18 (1993).
8. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. See Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at
658-61; Elson, Board-Based Solution, supra note 1, at 942; Elizabeth Maclver Neiva, Are
Directors Overpaid? What History Tells Us About Compensation, in DiRECTORSHIP-SIG-
NIFICANT ISSUES FACING DIRECTORS 2-4, 2-6 (1996).
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compensation was crumbling, and directors increasingly were receiving
cash compensation for their services. 9
Because directors primarily were appointees of management and sub-
ject to management approval in relation to retention, the interests of the
directors naturally became more aligned with the group that selected and
retained them than with the stockholders. This was the real origin of the
board passivity vis- -vis management oversight with which we grapple to-
day. If a director owed his or her position (and continuance in that seat)
to management largesse and that position entailed considerable compen-
sation and prestige, the director had little personal incentive to actively
challenge the appointing party. 10 This trend became increasingly more
pronounced throughout the 1980s with changes in board compensation
practices. In addition to simple cash retainers (which were becoming in-
creasingly more generous-amounting to $40,000 or more at many com-
panies), directors began to receive numerous and substantial other
benefits for board service. The typical director of a large, publicly traded
corporation was now provided, among other things, with a substantial
pension for board service following retirement, company-sponsored
health and life insurance, and significant charitable donations to organi-
zations of the director's choosing. Perhaps the most generous benefit of
all, provided to selected directors, was a rich consulting contract, at rates
far exceeding those for regular board service.11
9. See infra notes 31, 46-51 and accompanying text. Elson, Shareholding Directors
Create Better Corporate Performance, supra note 1, at 7-3; Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 33 (1953); EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POWER 58 (1981).
10. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 658-61; Elson, Board-Based Solution, supra
note 1, at 942. Ralph V. Whitworth, President of the United Shareholders Association,
characterizes the relationship between the CEO and his hand-picked directors as one
where "[y]ou dance with who brought you." CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jul-Aug. 1992, at 131 (comments of Ralph V. Whitworth). Therefore, it is not
surprising that "this crowd rarely argues when it comes to approving a CEO's pay." Id. at
132. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION § 11.2 (1976).
See generally MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1986).
11. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF NACD
BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION app. (1995) [hereinafter NACD
REPORT]; Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 692-94; Elson, Board-Based Solution, supra
note 1, at 947-49; Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, supra note 2, at 168; SPENCER STU-
ART, EXECUTIVE SEARCH CONSULTANTS, 1995 BOARD INDEX: BOARD TRENDS AND
PRACTICES AT MAJOR AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 38-43 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 BOARD
INDEX]. Remuneration for nonemployee directors often exceeds $40,000, including their
annual retainer, the fee received for attending meetings, and any additional compensation
they may receive for chairing committees. For example, nonemployee directors receive
annual compensation in the amount of $50,000 at General Electric, $40,000 at Exxon,
$55,000 at IBM, and $64,000 at American Express. Moreover, these nonemployee direc-
tors usually receive a fee of between $1000 and $2000 for each meeting attended. In addi-
tion, committee chairmen usually receive a supplemental retainer of between $3000 and
$5000 per year. AMERICAN ExPREss CO., MAR. 15, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 7 (1995);
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., MAR. 16, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 10 (1995);
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., MAR. 7, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 7-8 (1995). Often remunera-
tion goes beyond annual compensation and payments for meetings attended. Each nonem-
ployee director at Eastman-Kodak is covered by group term-life insurance in the amount
of $100,000. EASTMAN-KODAK, MAR. 10, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 5 (1995). Until this
DIRECTOR COMPENSATION
All of these special forms of compensation, it has been argued, were
necessary to retain the services of top-flight director talent.12 Unfortu-
nately they also compromised outside director independence from man-
agement, thus further fueling the board passivity that resulted in minimal
management oversight and poor corporate performance. Today, board
compensation treats the outside director as an employee of management,
rather than a fiduciary of the shareholders. The nonmanagement board
member's stake in the enterprise does not reflect the performance-based
concerns of ownership, but instead reflects the interests of a highly sala-
ried company employee. Outside directors, whose compensation is unre-
lated to corporate performance, have little personal incentive to
challenge their management benefactors. Eager not to "bite the hand
that feeds them," it is little wonder that boards became so passive and
subject to management domination.
As board compensation practices may have acted to compound the
problem of board passivity, these practices may also form the basis for its
solution. To break management's grip on the board and stimulate real
oversight, an appeal must be made to the director's same sense of per-
sonal self-interest that initially created the problem. There is nothing in-
herently wrong with a management-appointed board. The problem arises
when a management-sponsored director fails to exercise appropriate
oversight because of loyalty to the appointing party. The outside direc-
tors must be motivated to view management not from the perspective of
a loyal employee, fearful of discharge, but from the viewpoint of an
owner, concerned with overall profitability. To ensure that directors will
examine executive initiatives in the best interest of the business, the
outside directors must become substantial shareholders. To facilitate this,
directors' fees must be paid primarily in company stock that is restricted
year, nonemployee directors at American Express who have served at least five years were
eligible to receive $30,000 per annum upon their retirement from the board; these pay-
ments continue for a number of years equal to the time served on the board or until death.
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., MAR. 14, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT 5 (1991). Similarly, General
Electric's nonemployee directors who have served at least five years, are over the age of
65, and retire directly from the board are eligible to receive either an annual payment for
life equal to the amount of the last retainer received or a $450,000 life insurance policy.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., MAR. 3, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT 13 (1992). Heinz Co. pays,
upon a company director's death, $1 million to the charity of choice. The amount the
company will donate to qualifying charitable organizations on each present director's be-
half ranges from $750,000 to $2 million based upon the director's length of service to the
company. HEINZ CO., MAY 24, 1996 PROXY STATEMENT (1996). Ogden Corp. pays one
board member $1000 per month to consult with management on health issues. The com-
pany pays to another director $5000 monthly for consultation on "international" issues.
OGDEN Co., APR. 12, 1996 PROXY STATEMENT (1996).
12. See Joann S. Lublin, Management: Investors Push to Ax Pensions for Outsiders,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1995, at B1. "'We want to attract the best directors that we can,' says
Rae Paltiel, corporate secretary of the Morris Plains, N.J., drug maker. The trick 'is to
make sure directors have a comparable package, and being on our board is as good as
being on any other board."' Id. "Such pensions also 'encourage directors to think about
the company long-term, which is one of the things you want directors to do."' Id. (quoting
William G. Bowen, president of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in New York and an
outside member of Merck, American Express Co., and Reader's Digest Association Inc.).
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as to resale during their term in office. No other form of compensation
which acts to compromise their independence from management should
be permitted. The goal is to create within each director a personal moti-
vation to actively monitor management in the best interest of corporate
productivity and to counteract the oversight-inhibiting environment that
management appointment and cash-based fees create.
In June 1995, in what business commentators termed a major develop-
ment in American corporate governance, the National Association of
Corporate Directors' Commission on Director Compensation released a
report calling for a radical overhaul of the compensation system for U.S.
public company directors. 13 Focusing on greater board equity ownership,
the Commission made a series of recommendations designed to improve
corporate governance by changing board pay practices to more closely
align director and shareholder interests. Of greatest importance, the
panel called upon companies to pay their directors primarily in stock, set
substantial stock ownership targets for directors, and abolish all benefit
programs, including pension plans, for board members. 14
Since the report's release, a substantial number of companies have
adopted the Commission's recommendations on director stock ownership
and elimination of directors' pensions, including some of the nation's
largest and most respected corporate institutions.15 That trend acceler-
ated considerably with the approach of the 1996 proxy season, as the In-
vestor Rights Association of America (IRAA), a small-shareholder
advocacy group, announced that it was proposing over 120 shareholder
resolutions calling for the discontinuation of director pension plans and
the adoption of outside director stock-based compensation.16 With the
13. NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 9-18.
14. Id. See Joann S. Lublin, Give the Board Fewer Perks, A Panel Urges, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 1995, at B1; Allen R. Meyerson, Panel Backs Shift in Board Members' Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19,1995, at D4; Philip Bassett, US 'Greenbury' to Callfor Radical Shake-up on
Pay, TIMES (London), June 16, 1995, at A4; Tony Jackson & William Lewis, Call to Pay US
Directors in Stock, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at 3; Martha M. Hamilton, Panel Recom-
mends that Corporate Directors be Paid with Stock, WASH. POST, June 20, 1995, at D5.
15. Some of the companies making these changes include the following: American
Express, Archer-Daniels-Midland, Bell Atlantic, Campbell Soup, Chrysler, Digital Equip-
ment, IBM, ITT, Kaufman & Broad, McGraw Hill, NationsBank, NYNEX, Texas Instru-
ments, Westinghouse Electric, and Woolworth. Elson, Major Shifts Seen in Director Pay,
supra note 1, at 3; Jonathan Auerbach, Director's Cut: The Trend Toward Stock-Based Pay
Has Spread to Board Members, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R6; Jill E. Lyons, Restructur-
ing Director Pay Leads to Increased Payouts, ISSUE ALERT, June 1996, at 1; Dana W. Lin-
den, Off With Their Perks, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 54, 60. In fact, prior to the report's
release and apparently mindful of the relationship between director stock ownership and
better oversight and performance, a number of large corporations accordingly adjusted
their compensation practices. Scott Paper, Travelers Group, and Alexander & Alexander
adopted solely equity-based director compensation plans. In fact, Scott Paper's stock
jumped three percent in value on the date its equity plan was made public; IBM announced
that it was scaling back its board pension program and was switching from a primarily cash-
based to a 50% equity, 50% cash director compensation package. Elson, Shareholding
Directors Create Better Performance, supra note 1, at 7-4.
16. Letter from Thomas E. Flanagan, President, Investors' Rights Association of
America, to the members of Investors' Rights Association of America (1995) (on file with
author). See Linden, Off With Their Perks, supra note 15, at 60; Auerbach, supra note 15,
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widespread coverage of the IRAA's efforts by the national financial press
along with the group's success in previous years in attracting substantial
shareholder support for their efforts, a number of companies voluntarily
adopted the director compensation changes requested by the organiza-
tion in exchange for the withdrawal of its shareholder proposals. 17 If cur-
rent trends continue, within a short time equity-based director
compensation will have become the norm for most of America's largest
corporations.
This development has significance far beyond the change it represents
in director compensation structure. It promises to fundamentally alter a
decades-old norm of corporate governance-the separation of ownership
and control and resulting management-created board passivity. Oddly
enough, while director compensation was an outgrowth of the split be-
tween ownership and control, it may also result in their reunification. By
changing the form of compensation to include primarily equity, we will
make the directors substantial owners of the corporation once again and
perhaps will have finally found the solution to the conundrum Berle and
Means identified over sixty years ago. With board control in the hands of
owner-directors once again, boards should become more active manage-
ment monitors and the oversight-driven problems resulting from board
passivity will become much less prevalent. This Article will explore the
legal history of director compensation and explain why the current move-
ment towards equity-based compensation will reunite ownership and con-
trol to create more active board oversight of management and a
healthier, more competitive corporation.
I. THE HISTORY OF DIRECTOR COMPENSATION
To understand why equity-based director compensation will reinvigo-
rate previously passive boards, it is first necessary to examine the historic
origins of board compensation and how the rise of the large-scale public
corporation effected dramatic change in its prevalence and structure.
Traditionally, corporate directors received no direct compensation for
their services. Early corporate legal doctrine clearly stated that directors
were not entitled to remuneration for their activities as board members.
In the early days of the American industrial age, virtually all companies
were closely held by a relatively small group of investors. Directors were
simply major shareholders and their board service was considered to have
at R6; Jonathan P. Decker, Firms Cut Director Pay, but CEO Salaries Soar, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 10, 1996, at 6; Joann S. Lublin, More Companies Are Dumping Pensions
for Outside Directors as Activists Prevail, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1995, at A4; Michael Selz,
Big Companies Heed Investors' Call for Cutting Outside Directors' Benefits, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 1996, at B2; David Henry, Investor Rights Gadfly Group Has a Big Sting, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1995, at B3.
17. Lublin, supra note 16, at A4; Selz, supra note 16, at B2; Henry, supra note 16, at
B3; Checklist of 1995 Shareholder Proposals on Director Compensation, INVESTOR RE-
SPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, Apr.-June 1995,
at 21, 21-22 [hereinafter 1995 Shareholder Proposals Checklist].
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resulted from their desire to protect and enhance the value of their in-
vestment. Hence no compensation was. necessary or desirable. 18 They
assumed their posts not to earn a paycheck, but to monitor and grow the
value of their stake. As an 1846 corporate law treatise noted, "Directors
of corporations ... are not usually compensated for their ordinary serv-
ices as directors."'19 This was because directors were not "servants of the
company" (i.e., employees) and therefore not entitled to remuneration
for services in that capacity. 20
The courts' approach to the issue reflected this viewpoint. Throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, courts did not support the
notion that a corporate director was entitled to remuneration for his ordi-
nary services as director. In 1899, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
National Loan & Investment Co. v. Rockland Co.21 clearly spelled out the
traditional judicial approach to the issue when it stated:
The directors of a corporation are trustees for its stockholders. They
represent and act for the owners of its stock. Ordinarily the employ-
ment of a servant by a corporation raises the implication of a con-
tract to pay fair wages or a reasonable salary for the service
rendered, because it is the custom to pay such compensation, and
men rarely sacrifice their time and expend their labor or their money
in the service of others without reward. Directors of corporations,
however, usually serve without wages or salary. They are generally
financially interested in the success of the corporation they repre-
sent, and their service as directors secures its reward in the benefit
which it confers upon the stock which they own .... The presump-
tion of law follows the custom .... From the service of a director,
the implication is that he serves gratuitously. 22
Delaware law was similarly hostile to the concept of director remuner-
ation because "[d]irectors [were] presumed to serve without compensa-
tion." 23 The leading case was Lofland v. Cahall.24 In this 1922 decision,
the Delaware Supreme Court, in affirming a Court of Chancery decision,
ruled that the directors of a corporation had no right to compensation for
services provided in the course of their duties as directors unless author-
ized by the company's stockholders, charter, or bylaws.2 5 Neither the
charter nor bylaws of the company involved in the litigation authorized
payment to the directors of salaries or compensation for their services.26
18. PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 158-59 (1955). "The legal as-
sumption that directors serve gratuitously was a natural concomitant of director-stock-
holder concurrence in the small local enterprise, in which directors had the incentives of
stockholders to serve the common interest." Id. See MORTIMER FEUER, HANDBOOK FOR
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 169-70 (1965); BRANSON, supra note 7.
19. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGRE-
GATE 309-11 (1846).
20. Id. at 311.
21. 94 F. 335 (8th Cir. 1899).
22. Id. at 337.
23. Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921).
24. 118 A. 1 (Del. Ch. 1922).
25. Id. at 6-7.
26. Id. at 3.
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All of the directors did, however, own a substantial amount of the com-
pany's capital stock.27 The remuneration at issue involved cash payments
voted by the directors to themselves in the years 1912 through 1917 and
an issuance of stock to each director without consideration in 1911.28 In
finding these payments unlawful, the court endorsed what it called "gen-
eral principles of law and equity" to be considered in this context:
1. Directors of a corporation are trustees for the stockholders, and
their acts are governed by the rules applicable to such a relation,
which exact from them the utmost good faith and fair dealing....
2. [Directors] have no right to compensation for services rendered
within the scope of their duties as directors, unless it is authorized by
the charter, by-laws, or the stockholders of the company.
3. [Directors] have no right to compensation for services rendered
outside their duties as directors unless there had been an express
contract to pay for such services, or,... unless ... performed under
circumstances sufficient to show that it was understood by the proper
officers.... that the services were to be paid for by the corporation.
4. A contract to pay compensation for such services must be made
with directors, or other proper corporate officers who have no per-
sonal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract .... 29
It is interesting to note that in setting forth these principles, the court
explained that because each was "so well settled, it is not deemed neces-
sary to cite cases to support them."'30 However, by stating that services
provided by a director outside the scope of his regular duties might be
27. Id.
28. Id. The payments received were paid as salaries or compensation for extra serv-
ices claimed to have been rendered for the company.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. A review of six of the more prominent corporate law treatises authored in the
late 19th and 20th centuries revealed that all took a more or less common view on the
director compensation issue. Each had the following elements in common:
1. Unless otherwise provided in the charter or by-laws, directors are not
entitled to compensation for their services as directors. This is because they
are presumed to work for the welfare of the corporation and not in expecta-
tion of receiving compensation.
2. Even though a director may also hold an executive position, there is still
a presumption that he is serving gratuitously. This presumption may be over-
come, however, by showing, from the surrounding facts and circumstances,
that an understanding or implied agreement existed that he should receive
compensation.
3. Where at the request of the board, a director performs some extra or
special work (extraordinary) outside the line of his duties as director, he will
generally be entitled to receive compensation, unless the circumstances jus-
tify an inference that he was giving his services to the corporation
gratuitously.
4. Traditionally, the only compensation received by directors were nomi-
nal fees paid to them for attending board meetings.
WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 531-32
(1897); THOMAS CONYNGTON, A MANUAL OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 147-48 (3d ed.
1909); 5A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 2109-10 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1995); WILLIAM J. GRANGE, CORPORATION
LAW FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 667 (3d. ed. 1967); Louis PRASHKER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1000-01 (1937).
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compensable, the court left open the possibility of legal director compen-
sation. In relation to this point, the Delaware Court of Chancery in a
1928 ruling stated:
[It was] aware that the Supreme Court in the Lofland case used lan-
guage from which the inference might be drawn that if the services
rendered by the directors in securing the sale of their company's
stock or bonds were such as to amount to "exceptional or extraordi-
nary efforts," it might be proper for them to receive compensation
for such services. But this is only an inference. 31
However, it would be a number of years before there would be full legal
acceptance of broad-based director compensation in Delaware.
The legal hostility to ordinary director compensation had its origins in
the nineteenth century and appeared to have remained very much intact
even through the 1940s. In a 1946 case, an Ohio court, considering a
compensation dispute, stated that "because of the fiduciary relationship
of directors courts will closely scrutinize and strictly construe contracts
for compensation between a corporation and a director. '32 In this re-
gard, the court noted the oft-cited presumption that directors serve with-
out compensation and that "they are entitled to no salary or other
compensation for the performance of the usual and ordinary duties per-
taining to the office of director in the absence of some express provision
or agreement to that effect. ' 33 But despite this court's concern with di-
rector compensation, by the time of this decision, the financial commu-
nity as a practical matter had abandoned any concern with the propriety
of such compensation and many directors were in fact being
compensated.
Although traditionally directors were not compensated for their serv-
ices as "[c]orporate offices [were] usually filled by those chiefly interested
in the welfare of such institutions by reasons of interest in stock or other
advantages, and such interests [were] presumed to be the motive for exe-
cuting duties of office without compensation," 34 this did not necessarily
mean that directors received absolutely no additional reward for their
services. First of all, it was not uncommon for directors to receive some
kind of "nominal" payment for their attendance at board meetings-usu-
ally a gold double eagle (worth twenty dollars) placed in front of their
seats at each board meeting.35 Secondly, there was probably some "un-
stated" compensation that directors received for board service. This form
of compensation included such things as "lucrative tips-advance infor-
mation-concerning proposed stock manipulations, consolidations, merg-
ers, stock split-ups, opportunities to be included in preferred stock lists
31. Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 141 A. 54, 63 (Del. Ch. 1928).
32. Holms v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ohio C.C.P. 1946).
33. Id.
34. First Nat'l Bank of Allen v. Daugherty, 250 P. 796, 797 (Okla. 1926).
35. BISHOP, supra note 7, § 1.02; Linden, Off With Their Perks, supra note 15, at 58;
Carey et al., supra note 1, at 2.
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and to share in ground-floor stock subscription. ' 36 Thus, the ability to
engage in lucrative insider trading was a reward for faithful board service.
Nevertheless, the ability to directly monitor one's investment in a com-
pany still seemed the primary motivation for board service and explained
why, for many years, directors were not directly compensated for their
services.
The early twentieth century witnessed not only the phenomenal growth
of the American economy, but also the growth of those corporate entities
whose activities comprised that economy. Corporations were no longer
local ventures owned, controlled, and managed by a handful of local en-
trepreneurs, but instead had become national in size and scope. Concom-
itant with the rise of the large-scale corporation came the development of
the professional management class, whose skills were needed to run such
far-flung enterprises. 37 And as the capitalization required to maintain
such entities grew, so did the number of individuals required to contrib-
ute the funds to create such capital. Thus, we saw the rise of the large-
scale public corporation-owned not by a few, but literally thousands and
thousands of investors located throughout the nation. And with this
growth in the size and ownership levels of the modem corporation, indi-
vidual shareholdings in these ventures became proportionally smaller and
smaller, with no shareholder or shareholding group now owning enough
stock to dominate the entity. Consequently, the professional managers
moved in to fill this control vacuum.38 Through control of the proxy pro-
cess, incumbent management nominated its own candidates for board
36. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 159.
37. Coincident with the rise of a new managerial class, was the development of an
educational system to train this group. The creation of the modern business school and
collegiate business curriculum was a response to the need for the professional manager. A
history of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business written in 1954 details this
phenomenon:
In the Wharton school, before the nineteenth century ended, business edu-
cation began to shift in interest and emphasis from the general to the special,
from the speculative to the practical, to the scientific, to the professional.
The remarkable spread of collegiate business education during the last
forty years is not difficult to explain. It has been part and parcel of the
growth and expansion of American economic activity. The increase in the
number, in the size, and the complexity of business enterprises has given rise
to progressive needs for better means and methods of supervision manage-
ment, and control, as well as for highly specialized services designed to meet
the requirements created by the division and the diversification of functions
of the individual enterprise. Among all the needs of the business world,
none has given greater concern than the need for a high grade of managerial
personnel, competent to analyze problems as they arise and competent to
cope with them promptly and successfully.
The main tasks of schools of business are (1) the training of technicians in
fundamentals recognized as measurably common to a variety of businesses;
and (2) the developing, in a carefully selected group of students, of an aware-
ness of factors underlying policy and planning in business enterprise requir-
ing the exercise of managerial responsibility and judgment.
THURMAN W. VAN METRE, A HISTORY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS COLUM-
BIA UNIVERSrrY 6, 7, 9 (1954).
38. Neiva, supra note 8, at 2-6.
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membership. The board of directors, theoretically composed of the rep-
resentatives of various shareholding groups, instead was comprised of in-
dividuals selected by management. The directors' connection with the
enterprise generally resulted from a prior relationship with management,
not the stockholding owners, and they often had little or no shareholding
stake in the company.
Berle and Means in their path-breaking book The Modern Corporation
and Private Property described this phenomenon of the domination of the
large public corporation by professional management as the separation of
ownership and control. The firm's nominal owners, the shareholders, in
such companies exercised virtually no control over either day-to-day op-
erations or long-term policy. 39 Instead control was vested in the profes-
sional managers who typically owned only a very small portion of the
firm's shares.40 This separation occurred because stock ownership in the
large-scale public company was diffused amongst many shareholders,
with no shareholder or shareholding group owning enough shares to ma-
terially affect the corporation's management.41 Berle and Means spoke
of the ownership/control split in terms of the surrender of control by the
shareholders to management and the transformation of the owner from
an active agent with discretion over property to a state of passivity in
which the owner was "practically powerless through his own efforts to
affect the underlying property. '42
[There] lies a more fundamental shift. Physical control over the in-
struments of production has been surrendered in ever growing de-
gree to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, supposedly,
but by no means necessarily, for the benefit of the security holders.
Power over industrial property has been cut off from the beneficial
ownership of the property .... We see, in fact, the surrender and
regrouping of the incidence of ownership, which formerly bracketed
full power of manual disposition with complete right to enjoy the
use, the fruits, and the proceeds of physical assets. There has re-
sulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its compo-
nent parts, control and beneficial ownership.43
They summarized the state of the "modem corporation" as one "in which
the individual interest of the shareholder is definitively made subservient
to the will of a controlling group of managers even though the capital of
the enterprise is made up out of the aggregated contributions of perhaps
many thousands of individuals. '"44
One consequence of this phenomenon identified by Berle and Means
was the filling of board seats with individuals selected not from the share-
holding ranks, but chosen instead because of some prior relationship with
39. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 3-6.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id. at 277.
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management. Boards were now comprised either of the managers them-
selves (the "inside directors") or associates of the managers, not other-
wise employed by or affiliated with the enterprise (the "outside" or
"nonmanagement directors"). As one prominent business historian has
explained:
As they became increasingly influential, corporate managers had
little incentive to invite assertive individuals who might challenge
their authority to fill the board seats .... As one observer explained:
"Many chief executives are not really convinced that they wanted a
strong and independent group of directors. After all, the chief exec-
utive fought long and hard to reach his position of power. Is it not
normal and natural for him to tend to avoid critical review of his
stewardship?" Managers instead invited fellow insiders and promi-
nent community members, as well as corporate attorneys and com-
mercial bankers to serve on their boards ....
Although directors enjoyed next-to-no influence over senior man-
agers and played a negligible role in the formulation of corporate
strategy, executives had little difficulty finding individuals willing to
serve on their boards. Some accepted invitations because they
feared that if they refused, they might later find it difficult to locate
executives to sit on their own boards. Others viewed directorships as
a form of public service, "much as someone who must serve on the
board of governors or greens committee of the golf club." 45
Because boards of the large public corporations were now comprised
of a number of outside individuals with little connection to the enterprise
other than their relation with management, changes would have to be
made in the corporation's relationship with them. This new breed of
outside director often had little or no shareholding interest in the enter-
prise and, as such, no longer represented their own personal financial
stakes or those of the other shareholders in rendering board service.
However, as the shareholders' legal fiduciaries, the outside directors were
still expected to expend independent time and effort in their roles, and,
consequently, it began to be recognized that they must now be compen-
sated directly for their activities.
Without a substantial personal investment in the company, a token
twenty-dollar gold piece did not constitute a sufficient reward for the
time this new breed of director devoted to corporate activities. Thus, real
compensation was necessary to encourage board membership and stimu-
late effective service. A 1940 article entitled The Board of Directors ap-
pearing in the Harvard Business Review argued:
The compensation of directors is peculiarly a problem to be worked
out according to particular circumstances. To the extent that it is
now possible to generalize, it can be said that if the optimum func-
tions of a board are to be performed and one excuse for partial per-
formance or invisible rewards removed, directors should be paid
45. Neiva, supra note 8, at 2-6 to 2-7.
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substantial rather than nominal salaries or fees for their services.46
In fact, Berle and Means themselves supported the establishment of a
compensation scheme for corporate board members. They criticized the
lack of an "adequate system of payment" for corporate directors because
"[t]he director's fee does not remotely compensate for successful and
faithful management. '47 Their solution was "an honest and fully dis-
closed profit sharing scheme of some kind .... 48
Within fifteen years, the director compensation situation had changed
dramatically. In a 1947 study entitled Compensation and Duties of Cor-
porate Directors, the Conference Board reported the following:
There has been a significant trend in the last ten years toward remu-
nerating directors on an annual salary basis. Approximately one out
of every five of the surveyed companies now pays outside directors
either a straight salary or a base salary plus a fee for each meeting
attended. Paying directors a salary more nearly commensurate with
the duties and liabilities attached to the position is coming to be rec-
ognized as serving the best interests of both the corporation and the
shareholders. 49
This sea change in compensation practice can be traced to the changing
composition of public corporate boards, now increasingly staffed with
management appointees, rather than controlling shareholders-a by-
product of the dramatic shift in corporate control identified by Berle and
Means. As representatives of management, without a financial stake in
the business, the outside, nonmanagement board members needed to be
compensated for their time and effort devoted to corporate activities. In-
deed, Berle and Means's work probably had something to do with this
change in remuneration practice. In reporting on the move to director
compensation, the Conference Board specifically referred to their study
and its call for director remuneration, labeling the two professors "out-
standing authority. '50
46. George E. Bates, The Board of Directors, 19 HARV. Bus. REV. 72, 85 (1940).
47. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 225 n.6.
48. Id.
49. Paul W. Dickson, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., COMPENSATION AND DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECrORS 3 (1947) [hereinafter 1947 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT]. A
1948 study sponsored by the Stanford Business School found the following:
Compensation of directors varies. All companies participating in this study
reimburse directors for traveling expenses incurred in connection with at-
tendance at board meetings. Most companies, in addition, pay fees for at-
tendance, the amounts being about equally divided between $20, $50, and
$100 per meeting. Several companies compensate directors for attendance at
committee meetings on the same basis as for attendance at directors' meet-
ings. About one-half of the companies that pay fees for attendance at meet-
ings exclude those directors who are full-time executives and who are on the
salary roll of the company. Two companies pay annual stipends to outside
directors regardless of the number of meetings attended. Five companies re-
port that no fees are paid to any director.
PAUL E. HOLDEN ET AL., ToP-MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 235 (1948).
50. 1947 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 49, at 6. As was noted in a 1955
treatise on corporate management:
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In what was later to be a significant development, as the compensation
of outside corporate directors in the large corporation became increas-
ingly more typical, a movement began for substantially increasing the
level of that remuneration. A 1950 article in the Harvard Business Re-
view strongly encouraged this change:
An important step to be taken to improve the boards of most large
companies is to increase the remuneration of board members. This
is probably the most underpaid group of individuals in the American
business system today, in view of its responsibilities and at least po-
tential services. The average outside director received approxi-
mately $850 during 1945, with other directors averaging $625. By
1946, according to a study of 184 directors of large companies, about
3 out of 5 were receiving in the aggregate over $1,000 per year-an
improvement, but still by no means sufficient.
The importance of director's functions, together with the desirabil-
ity of providing incentives for the best men, makes the remuneration
problem a vitally important one. From a strictly psychological point
of view, the director who is receiving only a nominal fee for attend-
ing board meetings may unconsciously devote to the affairs of the
company only as much effort and time as the fee seems to warrant.
In the case of professional directors, for whom salary is the prime
incentive, the importance of compensation is obviously
magnified....
Other reasons for deeming increased remunerations desirable in-
clude the fact that legal liability may jeopardize the director's per-
sonal fortunes. There have been many cases where, even after his
death, his estate has been involved in litigation for years. Another
reason is the fact that executives are likely to feel greater freedom in
using the abilities of directors who receive reasonable compensation.
In turn, most directors will not be willing to accept substantial com-
pensation unless they are able to give to the corporation commensu-
rate performance. Obviously, the company which recognizes the
importance of all these factors should be rated up.51
Despite the dramatic change in director compensation practice that be-
gan in the 1930s and 1940s and appeared to have its roots in the new type
of director occasioned by the Berle and Means's separation of ownership
and control, the legal recognition of this movement was a bit slow in com-
ing, providing yet another demonstration of the difficulty in amending
legal standards to meet changing cultural expectations. Even with the
The legal assumption that directors serve gratuitously was a natural concomi-
tant of director-stockholder concurrence in the small local enterprise, in
which directors had the incentives of stockholders to serve the common in-
terest. But as the cycle has replaced the stockholder-director with separate
ownership and management, so the legal concept of no compensation for
directors has given way to the practical recognition of the need for director
monetary incentive.
JACKSON, supra note 18, at 158-59.




growing recognition by the late 1940s that directors should and, in fact,
were being regularly compensated for their services, the newly promul-
gated Model Business Corporation Act in its initial 1950 version 52 pro-
vided no legal recognition of this phenomenon. Section 33, entitled
Board of Directors, simply provided:
The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a
board of directors. Directors need not be residents of this State or
shareholders of the corporation unless the articles of incorporation
or by-laws so required. The articles of incorporation or by-laws may
prescribe other qualifications for directors.5 3
However, three years later, in 1953, the Committee on Business Corpo-
rations of the American Bar Association (ABA) revised the Model Act
to authorize the board of directors to set their own compensation. To
effect this change, a sentence was added to the end of section 33 that was
to change dramatically the corporate law's approach to the director com-
pensation issue. The new clause provided that "the board of directors
shall have the authority to fix the compensation of directors unless other-
wise provided in the articles of incorporation. '' 54 This statutory change
effectively overruled the century-old common law hostility to director
compensation and paved the way for even more sweeping change in the
structure and functioning of corporate boards. In making this revision,
the Committee noted that director compensation had "been a practice of
long standing without statutory recognition in many jurisdictions. ' 55 The
language of this provision, presumptively allowing for director compensa-
tion, has largely remained intact except for a change in 1984 which pro-
vided that by-laws, in addition to the articles of incorporation, could
specifically prohibit director compensation. 56
52. The primary purpose of the Model Business Corporation Act was to provide states
and bar association committees with a working model for revision and modernization of
their own corporate laws. Using the Model Act as a guide, states could adopt in whole or
in part provisions of the Model Act to modernize their corporate laws. The first draft of
the Model Act was completed in 1946 by the Committee on Business Corporations of the
American Bar Association under the title, "Model for State Business Corporation Acts."
The Committee recognized that this initial draft was incomplete and required further in-
tensive study. Following this further study and subsequent revisions, the Committee pub-
lished the first complete Model Business Corporation Act in 1950. See MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT, iv (preface 1950). Since 1950, the Model Act has undergone a number of
periodic revisions with the last full revision occurring in 1984 when the Committee pub-
lished the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. Acr (1984) (amended 1991).
53. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 33 (1950).
54. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 33 (1953). The current comparable provision is
located at § 8.11 which provides: "Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide
otherwise, the board of directors may fix the compensation of directors." MODEL BUSi-
NESS CORP. AcT § 8.11 (1991).
55. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN., COMMIttEE ON CORPORATE LAWS 756(1971).
56. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.11 (1984) ("Unless the articles of incor-




The Model Act was designed to provide states with a working model
for the revision and modernization of their corporate laws. Using the Act
as a guide, states could adopt in whole or in part its various sections to
modernize their corporate statutes.5 7 In the years following the Model
Act's addition of a director compensation provision, the states slowly be-
gan to enact their own versions,58 sometimes changing the provision
slightly. 59 Today, all but eight jurisdictions have enacted provisions ex-
pressly authorizing directors to fix board members' compensation. 60 Of
57. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, iv (preface 1950).
58. During the six years following the enactment of the Model Act's director compen-
sation provision (1954-60), twelve jurisdictions followed and enacted their own. See ALA.
Bus. CORP. ACT § 24 (1959); ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-41 (Supp. 1958); COLO.
CORP. ACT § 34 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-313, 33-314 (effective Jan. 1, 1961);
ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32 § 157.33; IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-208; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 496A.34; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-24, 55-30, 55-33; N.D. REV. CODE 10-1936 (Supp. 1957);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-35; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.30, 180.31.
Between 1960 and 1966, nine jurisdictions enacted director compensation provisions
similar to the Model Act's. See ARK. Bus. CORP. ACT § 36 A 576 (effective Jan. 1, 1966);
Miss. Bus. CORP. ACT § 34 (effective Jan. 1, 1963); NEB. Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (effective
Oct. 19, 1963); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(c) (effective Sept 1, 1963); S.D. Bus. CORP.
ACT § 33 H. B. 893 (effective July 1, 1966); UTAH Bus. CORP. ACT § 33 (effective Jan. 1,
1962); WASH. Bus. CORP. ACT § 37 (effective July 1, 1967); Wyo. Bus. CORP. ACT § 33
(effective July 1, 1961); D.C. Bus. CORP. ACT § 32 (effective Nov. 2, 1963).
Between 1966 and 1969, six jurisdictions enacted director compensation provisions simi-
lar to the Model Act's. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-701; LA. REV. STAT. § 12:81A; Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.310 (Vernon); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 15-2233; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1701.56(C), 1701.59(A), 1701.60; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1401, 1402.
Between 1969 and 1973, eight jurisdictions enacted director compensation provisions
similar to the Model Act's. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), (b), (h) (effective July
15, 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-6301(a), (b), (h) (effective July 1, 1972); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271A.175 (effective July 1, 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §§ 701, 702, 716,
717(5) (effective Jan. 1, 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1501,450.1546(3) (effective
Jan. 1, 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (effective Jan. 1, 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-
1.1-33 (effective Jan. 2, 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 1881 (effective July 1, 1971).
Between 1973 and 1977, six jurisdictions enacted director compensation provisions simi-
lar to the Model Act's. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-035 (effective July 1, 1976); CAL.
CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 164,204(d), 212(b)(4), 300(a) (effective Jan. 1, 1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.111(1), (2), (3) (effective Jan. 1, 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(1), (3), (4)
(effective Mar. 30, 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-34 (effective June 20, 1975); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-95 (effective July 1, 1975).
The last four states to enact director compensation provisions similar to the Model Act's
did so between 1977 and 1993. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-
35 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8.11 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-
111 (1995).
59. When enacted in 1953, the Model Act provision allowed director compensation
unless the articles of incorporation provided otherwise. Some states, however, provided in
their provisions that the articles or by-laws could prohibit director compensation. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-313, 33-314 (effective Jan. 1, 1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 32, § 157.33; WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.30, 180.31. Today, this difference is no longer
important as the current Model Act provision provides that both the articles and by-laws
can prohibit director compensation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.11 (1991).
60. The current states statutes codifying the right of directors to fix their compensation
are as follows: ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.11 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (1989); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-811 (Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-811 (Michie 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(c) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (1995); D.C. CODE. ANN. § 29-332 (1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.08101 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-811 (1994); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 415-35 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/8.05
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those that have not, there does not appear to remain any judicial hostility
to the notion of director compensation. With one exception, their corpo-
rate statutes are simply silent on the point.61
By the 1960s, director compensation had generally become an accepted
part of the American corporate landscape. Remuneration essentially
took one of three forms-a simple fee per board meeting attended, an
annual fee, or a "hybrid"-an annual retainer "plus a stated fee per meet-
ing."'62 But, despite the growing legal and financial acceptance of the no-
tion, compensation amounts remained relatively small. A corporate
director's handbook written in 1965 detailed the evolution of director re-
muneration, yet was unenthusiastic with what it called the slow pace to-
wards paying board members more substantial compensation amounts:
The tradition that directors serve with no or only token compensa-
tion stems from the early days of the corporation when the directors
were the proprietors whose compensation for the time and effort de-
voted to corporate affairs was expected to come through their stock-
holdings .... But there has been considerable change since those
days. Stock is scattered among many small owners, foundations, in-
vestment companies, mutual funds ..... Concomitantly, the trend
has been away from "inside" control and towards an "outside" ma-
jority, which is likely to view corporate problem areas with a greater
objectivity and, in theory at least, can represent the corporation (and
the body of stockholders) as 'independents' in matters in which the
officer-director group might have a personal interest and be tempted
to let the opportunity for self-aggrandizement get the upper-hand.
Despite this trend, and the fact that most corporations now have a
majority of outside directors, the token compensation tradition is
only slowly giving way to a realistic recognition that dedication-time
and effort is not purchased with a peppercorn. 63
(Smith-Hurd 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-10 (Burns 1995); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 490.811 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-
110 (Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(c) (West 1994); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§ 450.1505(3) (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.211 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN.
STAT. § 79-4-8.11 (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.310 (Vernon 1991); MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-427 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8.11
(Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8(3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-11-35 (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(e) (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-8-11 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-37 (1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.60(A)(3) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1027 (West 1986); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.334 (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1730 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33
(1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-111 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-5-
1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-111 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-811 (1995);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11a, § 8.11 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-683 (Michie 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.110 (West 1994); W.VA. CODE § 31-1-95 (1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.0811 (West 1992); Wyo. STAT. 17-16-811 (1989).
61. Louisiana provides that director's compensation may only be authorized by the
articles of incorporation or bylaws. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(C) (West 1994). Califor-
nia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Puerto Rico, and Texas do not directly ad-
dress the issue of directors' compensation. See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
ANN. 3d § 8.11 (Supp. 1993).
62. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 158-60.
63. FEUER, supra note 18, at 169-70.
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Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s the number of companies
providing regular compensation to their directors continued to grow as
did the amounts of that compensation. 64 In 1962, a substantial majority
of the largest American public corporations compensated their outside
directors. Among manufacturing companies, the median board meeting
fee was $200, and the median annual retainer was $2000.65 By 1975, vir-
tually all public companies compensated their directors and, among man-
ufacturing companies, the median annual compensation, including fees
and retainers, had grown to $6000, with the largest companies paying a
median of $13,000.66 However, beginning in the late 1970s, both the
amount of director remuneration and the form such compensation took
began to change dramatically. In an article published in the Business
Lawyer in 1976, Professors Leech and Mundheim argued that because of
the "time-consuming and dedicated service that is now being demanded
of the outside director, [many] are probably not being compensated ade-
quately. ''67 The Corporate Director's Guidebook, published shortly
thereafter by the ABA Business Law Section's Committee on Corporate
Laws, stated that because "it is expected that a non-management director
will devote substantial attention to the affairs of the corporation," he or
she should "be compensated accordingly."'68 Consequently, the amount
of cash compensation increased substantially, and other forms of remu-
neration began to appear.
By 1981, the median annual overall compensation paid to outside di-
rectors of the nation's most substantial public manufacturing companies
was $15,000. The largest operations paid a median of $25,000.69 Indeed,
according to data collected by Towers Perrin, the international compensa-
tion consulting firm, the 1981 median retainer for companies in the For-
tune 100 was $15,000, with the median payment for attending board or
committee meetings at $500.70 Additionally, a small but growing number
of companies began to supplement their directors' cash compensation
with varying combinations of employee-type benefits such as retirement
arrangements, life insurance, travel insurance, medical insurance, and
matching donations to charities of the directors' choice.71 A significant
64. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3. See JOHN R. KINLEY, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC.,
REPORT No. 103, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES, STUDIES IN BUSINESS POLICY
(1962) [hereinafter 1962 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT]; JEREMY BACON, CONFERENCE
BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 125, COMPENSATION AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS,
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT].
65. 1962 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 64, at 32.
66. JEREMY BACON, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 678, CORPORATE DI-
RECTORSHIP PRACTICES: COMPENSATION (1975) [hereinafter 1975 CONFERENCE BOARD
REPORT].
67. Noyes E. Leech & Robert H. Mundheim,. The Outside Director of the Publicly
Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799, 1831-32 (1976).
68. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1622 (1978).
69. JEREMY BACON, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 815, CORPORATE DI-
RECTORSHIP PRACTICES: COMPENSATION (1981) [hereinafter 1981 CONFERENCE BOARD
REPORT].
70. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3.
71. 1981 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 69, at 13.
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number of corporations started offering their outside directors the oppor-
tunity to defer their compensation on a tax-favored basis (reported by
38% of the Fortune 100 companies in 1981).72 And, by 1985, median total
annual compensation in the manufacturing sector had grown to $18,900,
with the median for the largest manufacturing corporations at $31,900.73
The number of companies offering the various forms of noncash compen-
sation outlined above had also increased in the four-year-period. 74
Two factors appeared to be responsible for the change in amount and
type of director compensation. The first was legal. During the 1970s, di-
rector liability became more of an issue, with shareholders bringing suit
in a number of instances where they believed directors had not acted in
their best interest. Professor Bishop, writing in 1981, spoke of such ac-
tions as "numerous and varied and [showing] every sign of proliferating
rather than diminishing. '75 Indeed, Professors Leech and Mundheim,
writing five years earlier, had argued that director compensation should
"include some component adequate to cover the legal risks of serving on
the board. The corporation can provide this through insurance and in-
demnity; failing that, the director's fees should include amounts adequate
to purchase insurance. ' 76 This fear of increased director legal liability
had a great impact on compensation practice. It led not only to larger
and more varied pay packages to compensate for the increased risk of
legal challenge, but to the creation of director and officer ("D & 0")
insurance plans to protect the directors.77 In fact, by 1985, 85% of the
nation's largest public companies offered their directors D & 0
coverage.78
The second factor responsible for the change in director remuneration
involved new theories on how the board should operate vis-A-vis manage-
ment. The concept of the "independent" board and the "independent"
director began to surface in legal and academic circles. The idea was that
boards should be independent of management involvement so as to exer-
cise proper oversight to ensure maximum corporate performance. 79 One
72. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3; 1981 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 69,
at 12.
73. JEREMY BACON, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 862, CORPORATE DI-
RECTORS' COMPENSATION (1985) [hereinafter 1985 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT].
74. Id. at 18.
75. BISHOP, supra note 7, § 1.01[1].
76. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 67, at 1832.
77. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3; Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the
Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158 (1990) [hereinafter Romano,
Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis]; see also Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Protecting
Outside Directors: D & 0 Insurance, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 5, 7 [hereinafter Block &
Hoff, Protecting Outside Directors: D & 0 Insurance]; Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Di-
rectors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 295-98 (1988); James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating
Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification,
43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988).
78. 1985 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 73, at 18.
79. Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 544-56 (1984) (reviewing the history of independent director
proposals and critiquing the ALI's tentative provisions and the underlying monitoring
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of the major thrusts of the American Law Institute's Corporate Govern-
ance Project of the early 1980s was to alter board structure and composi-
tion to minimize management domination. Only directors with no
significant relationship with management were to dominate the board's
more important oversight committees, such as Audit or Compensation.80
The kind of relationship that was considered problematic was direct em-
ployment by the company or the provision of such varied services to the
business as legal or financial advice (or almost any business relationship
with the corporation which provided the director with substantial finan-
cial benefit).8' While no mention was made of changing compensation
practices as a result of creating the "independent" board, the financial
independence from the company that the effort sought for the outside
director, acted to strengthen the argument for increased compensation
packages. The less connection that one had with an enterprise, the more
one should be compensated for their efforts on its behalf-for how else
could one be encouraged to expend the necessary time and effort in a job
for which one received no other reward? Therefore, an increase in direc-
tor compensation was necessary.
Although the early 1980s brought some changes in the nature and
amount of director compensation, it was not until the middle part of the
decade that a substantial shift in pay for outside directors began to occur.
The reason for the dramatic change was, by and large, primarily legal in
nature. Until 1985, there had been few challenges to director decision-
making alleging violations of the directors' duty of care which had re-
sulted in director liability. Although actions against directors for poor
decisions were certainly either filed or threatened, and the possibility of
liability, or at the very least adverse publicity, weighed on directors'
minds in the 1970s and early 1980s, very few actions were ever success-
ful.82 The duty of care proved relatively easy to satisfy. Under the tradi-
model). See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Cor-
poration Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
557, 561-65 (1984).
80. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.03-.07 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984).
81. Id. at § 1.26.
82. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 670; Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77
YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). After extensive research, Professor Bishop discovered only
four cases in which a court found that a director violated the duty of care, absent an allega-
tion of self-dealing. Bishop, supra, at 1099-1100; see New York Credit Men's Adjustment
v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397 (NY. 1953); Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc.,
273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Clayton v. Farish, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966). Even though all these
decisions resulted in director liability, Bishop stated that "none of these cases carries real
conviction." Bishop, supra, at 1100.
Several more recent commentators have also taken the view that the duty of care was an
easily satisfied standard for directors. They argued that in the few cases where the courts
found a breach of the duty of care, elements of director self-interest were present. See
William J. Carney, The ALI's Corporate Governance Project. The Death of Property
Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 922 n.126 (1993) ("I am aware of only five cases in
the history of American Corporate law that have held directors liable for breaches of the
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tional duty, a director was expected to carry out his or her responsibility
"with the care that an ordinary prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances. ' 83 Failure to meet this standard
would result in the imposition of liability upon the slothful director. This
would theoretically compel circumspect and diligent conduct in carrying
out the various responsibilities of board membership. However, under
the business judgment rule, a director would be found to have met this
duty of care if in making a specific business decision he or she acted with-
out self-interest, in an informed manner, and with a rational belief that
the decision was in the best interests of the corporation.84 A director who
duty of care, four of which seem tainted by conflicts of interest."); Cohn, supra note 4, at
591 n.1 ("Research reveals only seven successful shareholder cases not dominated by ele-
ments of fraud or self-dealing."); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary
Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1360 (1989) ("During
their century-long tenure, [care] standards have produced remarkably few cases holding
directors liable for unreasonable or careless decisions."); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation
Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927,
933 (1983) ("[Vjery few cases have imposed liability solely on the basis of a violation of the
duty of care."). Professor Scott also noted that "[m]any of the 'negligence' cases are
tainted by the presence of some element of conflicts of interest or personal gain." Id. at
933 n.23 (citing Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). See also Michael
P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461,482 (1992) (indicating
that the lack of decisions holding directors liable for violating the duty of care may signify
that "American judges have followed an [ajuthority [m]odel and have therefore intended
that their articulation of the duty of care be mostly hortatory").
83. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 669-70; MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 8.30 (3d ed. Supp 1996). The Model Business Corporation Act states the director's duty
of care as follows:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30. The American Law Institute has defined the
duty of care in a similar fashion:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the direc-
tor's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner he or she reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that
an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a
like position and under similar circumstances.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATION § 4.01(a) (1994) [hereinafter ALI].
Approximately 42 states have adopted statutory duty-of-care provisions. See 2 MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30, at 8-175. Many states have adopted a reasonable care
standard. ALl, supra; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1996); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963); 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30, at 8-176; see also Cohn,
supra note 4, at 593 n.7 (discussing the evolution of a common-law duty of care and the
later statutory duties of care); E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Stan-
dard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted ReeF? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980) (comparing the standard of care in
the Model Business Corporation Act § 35 with that of the Delaware case law); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-300(1)-(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989 & Supp. 1994).
84. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 669 n.36. In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984), the Delaware Supreme Court described the business judgment rule as follows:
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so acted in reaching a business decision was then protected from any legal
liability to his or her shareholders. As long as a director's actions were in
"good faith"-that is, not self-dealing-the business judgment rule stan-
dards were easy to satisfy, and, hence, actions alleging violations of the
duty rarely resulted in director liability.85
But, in 1985, this situation changed dramatically with the Delaware
Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom86 which toughened the
duty of care standard considerably and made director liability for slothy
decision-making no longer a remote possibility. In that case, the share-
holders of Trans Union Corp. brought suit after the board had approved
the sale of the company at a price deemed too low. The court, after
describing in great detail the board's decision-making process, found that
the board had made an "uninformed" judgment, pointing to, among
other things, the very brief amount of time it had deliberated on the
sale 87 and its failure to obtain expert outside financial advice. 88 As a re-
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpo-
ration acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interest of the company . . . . Absent an
abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The bur-
den is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
The American Law Institute has defined the rule in the following manner:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty under this [slection if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interest of
the corporation.
ALl, supra note 82, § 4.01(c); see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see
also Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1963); Richardson v. Blue Grass Min-
ing Co., 29 F. Supp. 658, 665 (E.D. Ky. 1939), affd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1942); Wall &
Beaver Street Corp. v. Munson Line, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 109, 115-16 (D. Md. 1944); Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & In-
strument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch.
1983).
Where a director has not made a business decision, such as in the case of an omission,
the business judgment rule does not apply, and the director should not be judged under the
reasonable care standard. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813.
For a complete discussion of the difference between the ALI's formulation of the busi-
ness judgment rule and that of the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis, see
Dooley, supra note 82, at 461.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
87. Id. at 874 (stating that the board was grossly negligent when it approved the sale of
the company after only two hours of deliberation).
88. Id. at 876-78; Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 677 n.56. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done
About It?, 1989 DuKE L.J. 27, 28 (1989); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Investment
Banker Opinions and Directors' Right to Rely, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1988, at 5; Charles M.
Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951, 958
(1992) [hereinafter Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?]; Robert
J. Giuffra, Jr., Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96
YALE L.J. 119, 119-20 (1986); see also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (finding
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suit, the directors faced the potential of being held personally liable for
the difference between the price actually paid for the company and what
the shareholders could have received had an "informed" decision been
reached.
This ruling, which still remains authoritative, had a major impact on
corporate and board behavior. It was responsible for the now common
use of third-party advisors to provide expert opinions to boards. 89 It also
led to far more elaborate decision-making procedures involving lengthy
meetings, voluminous documentation, and the like. 90 While the decision
attempted to improve the actual decisions that boards made, in reality, it
instead led to more form over substance, with directors spending more
time than necessary wading through papers and analyses simply to pro-
vide proof that their judgment was informed.91 Nevertheless, Van
Gorkom expanded the time and effort (if not always the diligence) that
directors had to give to their job and made the threat of legal liability for
not acting in an "informed" manner certainly more credible than it previ-
ously had been. 92
Not coincidentally, the Van Gorkom ruling came at a time when boards
were facing even more complex business decisions than ever before. In
the merger mania of the 1980s, as well as an increasingly competitive
global economy, the actions that boards were being called upon to take
had tremendous financial, and sometimes even social implications, not to
mention the ever present threat of legal challenge. With the director's
that the board's reliance on the advice of an investment banker fulfilled its duty of good
faith and reasonable investigation); Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d
490, 512 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that the board's reliance on the advice of an investment
banker satisfied its fiduciary duty).
89. See Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director
Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 103-04 (1989) (stating that to avoid due care viola-
tions after Van Gorkom, directors should "make use of independent, outside experts, at
least when the transaction is large enough to justify their use"); Elson, Duty of Care, supra
note 1, at 678 n.57; Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, supra
note 88, at 958-59; Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985) (providing "[t]he most immediate effect of Trans
Union will be that no firm considering a fundamental corporate change will do so without
obtaining.., documentation from outside consultants"); Giuffra, supra note 88, at 119-20;
Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1212, 1220-22 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Recon-
sidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 139 (1988).
Professor Fischel, commenting on the Trans Union ruling shortly after its announcement,
wryly noted that the "outside consultants are the biggest winners after Trans Union. The
decision requires their participation as a type of insurance no matter how worthless their
opinion is or how much it will cost." Fischel, supra, at 1453.
90. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 679-82; Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3-4. For
a listing of steps that directors should take to ensure a judicial finding of "informed" deci-
sion making, see Branson, supra note 89, at 103-09; Bayless Manning, Reflections and Prac-
tical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 8-14 (1985). See
also William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project: Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 239, 283-88 (1988) (discussing
the judicial determination of a properly informed business decision); Macey, supra note 89,
at 1219-21 (discussing the steps that directors should take pursuant to the ALl).
91. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 682-87.
92. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 3-4.
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position increasingly viewed as a "hot seat," companies became ex-
tremely concerned with the impact of these developments on director re-
cruitment and retention.93 Their response was to provide much richer
and more varied pay packages, along with greater D & 0 insurance cov-
erage and other indemnification arrangements. 94
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. In response to the Van Gorkom decision, a number of state legislatures took
action to reduce a director's risk of personal liability for actions taken while a board mem-
ber. Delaware was the first state to enact a statute that allowed the placement into the
corporations' certificate of incorporation by shareholder vote of a clause limiting or elimi-
nating director liability for a breach of the duty of care. Block & Hoff, Protecting Outside
Directors: D & 0 Insurance, supra note 77, at 5, 7. The Delaware statute provides that a
certificate of incorporation may contain the following:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit
the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law;(iii) under § 174 of the title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the direc-
tor derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991). "Within two years" following enactment of the
Delaware statute, some 41 states similarly amended their corporations statutes to limit
director liability. Romano, Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, supra note 77, at 1160. Most
of these statutes tracked the Delaware approach, but there were some variations. Some
states increased the level of culpability necessary to find personal liability. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums 1995) (requiring "willful misconduct or recklessness");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1992) (requiring "deliberate intent" or
"reckless disregard"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828(1)(a)-(d) (West 1993) (requiring "wilful
failure to deal fairly," "violation of criminal law," "improper personal profit," or "wilful
misconduct"). At least one state simply limited the amount of damages for which a direc-
tor may be liable. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A)(2) (Michie 1993) (capping the liability
at the greater of $100,000 or the amount of compensation received from the corporation
during the last 12 months). For further discussion on the different approaches state legisla-
tures used to limit director liability, see JOSEPH W. BISHOP JR., LAW OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE §§ 6.36-.86 (1994); Block &
Hoff, Protecting Outside Directors: D & 0 Insurance, supra note 77, at 5, 7; DeMott, supra
note 77, at 295; Hanks, supra note 77, at 1208-09; Romano, Aftermath of Insurance Crisis,
supra note 77, at 1160-68.
These statutes, however, have not necessarily eliminated the potential for, or the direc-
tor's fear of, personal liability. See Leo Herzel et al., Next-to-Last Word on Endangered
Directors, 87 HARV. Bus. REV. 38, 43 (1987) (stating that courts can circumvent the new
Delaware statute because "[w]ith only a little effort, courts could find directors liable for
disloyalty where before they would have found them liable for negligence"); Romano, Af-
termath of the Insurance Crisis, supra note 77, at 1161 (questioning the effectiveness of the
legislative response to director liability because "the statutes in most states do not exempt
from liability claims for breach of the duty of loyalty, violation of federal securities laws,
and breach of the duty of care by directors who are also officers"); Roberta Romano, What
Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 32(1989) (stating that limited liability statutes are ineffective because "plaintiffs will, in all
likelihood, be able to redraft their complaints to continue to bring lawsuits; for example,
instead of alleging negligence they will allege reckless behavior").
In addition to reducing directors' exposures by limiting personal liability, some states
increased director indemnification rights. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83E (West
1994); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney Supp. 1996); Block & Hoff, Protecting
Outside Directors: D & 0 Insurance, supra note 77, at 5, 7; DeMott, supra note 77, at 317-
22; Hanks, supra note 77, at 1221-24; Romano, Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis;,supra
note 77, at 1162-63. This approach, however, has also proved problematic. See Dennis J.
Block et al., Advising Directors on the D & 0 Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130, 146-
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By 1989, median total annual director compensation for the leading
publicly traded manufacturing companies had reached $24,000, 95 and the
largest corporations paid a median of $40,250.96 Of particular note were
the compensation practices of the Fortune 100 companies. By 1989, their
median annual retainer had risen to $25,000, up from $20,000 in 1985.
Board and meeting fees were also on the rise, with the median board fee
in 1989 at $1000, double the 1981 level.97
Additionally, corporations were now providing a multitude of noncash
compensation schemes for their outside directors. The director retire-
ment program, by which directors were entitled to substantial pensions
following their retirement from the board (typically at their preretire-
ment annual fee level), practically nonexistent among U.S. companies in
the early 1980s, had become the norm in the Fortune 100 by 1989. Sixty-
nine percent of those companies were now providing director retirement
plans, up from just eight percent in 1981.98 In addition, most companies
offered their directors D & 0 liability insurance, and a substantial
number were providing travel insurance, matching charitable donation
programs, accidental death insurance, life insurance, and even medical
coverage. 99
Today, the typical director receives a multifaceted package consisting
of many or all of the following items:
1. annual retainer, generally in cash, plus supplements for chairing
any board committee;
2. fees for attending board and committee meetings;
3. defined benefit retirement arrangements;
4. life insurance/medical insurance;
5. charitable contribution arrangements (where the corporation
makes sizeable donations to the charity of the board member's
choice, either through direct contributions or the purchase of a life
insurance policy on the director's life); 100
6. opportunities to defer cash compensation on a tax-favored ba-
sis; and
7. stock options or grants.101
47 (1986); Theodore D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director
and Officer Liability, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 912-13 (1993); John F. Olson, The D &
0 Insurance Gap: Strategies for Coping, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 3, 1986, at 25, 33 (stating that
"[indemnification is] only as good as the assets of the corporation"); see also MICHAEL
SCHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPO-
RATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 143-45 (1976) (listing several instances where indemnifi-
cation does not protect directors).
95. JEREMY BACON, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 922, CORPORATE DI-
RECTORS' COMPENSATION 3 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT].
96. Id. at 4.
97. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 4.
98. Id.
99. 1989 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 95, at 25.
100. NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 33.
101. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 4; NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 15.
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In addition, some companies also pay substantial consulting fees, some-
times amounting to six-figure sums, to directors for providing counsel on
particular issues.102 Finally, although not technically considered compen-
sation, most directors are reimbursed for expenses associated with their
board service and are indemnified by the company for any liability that
they might incur as a result of their actions.
In 1995, according to the Conference Board, the median total annual
director compensation among the nation's most substantial manufactur-
ing companies was $31,000.103 The largest companies paid a median of
$60,000, with a range of $35,000-$95,000.104 In fact, compensation con-
sultants Pearl, Meyer & Partners found that the average pay of directors
at America's 200 largest industrial companies for 1995 was $68,300.105
These figures, however, did not include the value of the other assorted
benefits given directors, including pension plans and charitable contribu-
tions, which substantially increased the averages. 106 Indeed, the various
benefits in the typical package increased the total compensation consider-
ably. For example, a director who retired at age sixty-five with a pension
equal to his or her annual retainer of, say, $30,000, might expect to re-
ceive anywhere from $200,000 to $400,000 over his or her lifetime. 10 7
And, through the charitable giving programs in place at a number of large
U.S. corporations, directors are afforded the opportunity to direct sub-
stantial amounts of corporate funds to the charities of their choice; in-
deed, the sums donated on each director's behalf could exceed $1,000,000
102. NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 15. Forbes recently reported on the following
director consulting arrangements:
Donald McHenry, former Ambassador to the United Nations and a director
of Coca-Cola, got $185,000, through his company, in fees last year from
Coca-Cola for consulting on international affairs.
Harold Brown, another former Defense Secretary, got $50,000 from Cum-
mins Engine for advice on technology issues. James D. Robinson IIl,
through his consulting company, got $250,000 from MacAndrews & Forbes,
one of Ronald Perelman's holdings.... Freeport-McMoRan, the natural re-
sources company, is paying twice for the services of former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger. The New Orleans firm paid Kissinger Associates $200,000
for its advice on global developments last year-and another $400,000 for
Mr. Kissinger's personal advice "on international matters."
Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, supra note 2, at 171, 172.
103. KAY WORRELL, CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., REPORT No. 1140-95-RR, CORPO-
RATE DIRECTORS' COMPENSATION 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 CONFERENCE BOARD
REPORT].
104. Id. at 12.
105. Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, supra note 2, at 169. According to Forbes:
Cash is only one of the incentives, but it is substantial. PepsiCo paid its
directors $70,000 for fulfilling their responsibilities last year. General Elec-
tric paid its directors an average of $81,000; at Bristol-Myers Squibb the fig-
ure was $77,000, at Chemical Bank, $88,000. PepsiCo also gives every
director $30,000 in stock each year. GE gives options for 3,000 shares and
Freeport-McMoRan options for 10,000 shares. Thus GE's 15 directors got an




107. Carey et al., supra note 1, at 5.
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per board member.10 8 Lifetime free medical and dental insurance was
not uncommon.' 0 9 Additionally, gifts in kind of free company services
were sometimes granted to the outside board members. These could in-
clude new automobiles, unlimited first-class air travel, free long distance
telephone service, or even computer equipment, adding many thousands
of dollars in value to each director's annual compensation package." 0
And, when special consulting arrangements were provided to selected
board members, their total compensation could well exceed $250,000 per
year."' Today's rich director compensation packages constitute much
more than token payments and are a far cry from the era when remunera-
tion consisted at the most of a shiny twenty-dollar gold piece.
At the turn of the century, a director's compensation essentially con-
sisted of the value he received from the enhancement of his equity invest-
ment through the exercise of a watchful eye. As companies became vast
economic enterprises no longer dominated by the equity owners, man-
agement assumed control and brought their own appointees to corporate
boards. Having little connection with the enterprise, other than a rela-
tionship with the appointing management, it was now necessary that the
nonmanagement board member director be compensated for his serv-
ices-hence the origins of director compensation. Management domina-
tion of the modern corporation was thus responsible for the creation of
director remuneration which, by the early 1990s, had grown to substantial
proportions. Given the current state of outside director compensation,
two questions are raised: Does the present amount and form of director
remuneration pose any harm to the effective functioning of the modern
board; and, if so, what should be done about it?
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRESENT
COMPENSATION SYSTEM
There is nothing inherently wrong with compensating corporate direc-
tors for the efforts that they expend on behalf of the corporation. Com-
pensation serves two functions: rewarding past works and encouraging
future efforts. Service on the modern public corporate board requires
great effort and skill. Monitoring the management of a multibillion dol-
lar, multinational operation to ensure maximum corporate operating effi-
ciencies entails amassing a detailed knowledge of the operation and
industry and close observation of how current management handles its
responsibilities. The amount of time that is necessary to devote to one's
duties as director, to do the job properly, is not inconsequential and
should be compensated appropriately to ensure the full devotion of one's
energies and talents to the task. Giving an individual little or nothing for
services rendered will encourage little or nothing in return. Therefore,
108. Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, supra note 2, at 170.
109. Id. at 170.
110. Id. at 170-71.
111. Id. at 173.
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director compensation is a necessary component in the modern corporate
structure. The problem with today's board remuneration is not necessar-
ily with its existence or significant amount, but with its form.
Director compensation evolved in this country because individuals who
served on boards, but otherwise had no interest in the underlying com-
pany, would not serve for free; they needed to be compensated for the
time and effort they expended. As the required effort became increas-
ingly more demanding as companies grew in size and complexity, and as
the potential for crippling legal liability for ill-performed services grew,
greater compensation was expected and paid. This development was per-
fectly natural and, in and of itself, not troublesome. What was problem-
atic was that at the same time compensation amounts were growing,
board passivity continued unabated and grew even more prevalent, creat-
ing substantial oversight-driven productivity declines in many of our na-
tion's largest business enterprises.
As was noted earlier, with the evolution of the management-controlled
enterprise, directors were appointed by management.112 The board of
directors, theoretically composed of representatives of various sharehold-
ing groups, was instead comprised of individuals selected by manage-
ment. The board was thus not representative of any one shareholder or
shareholder group, but was instead responsive to the leading officers of
the corporation. This phenomenon may be described as the "captured
board" syndrome. 113 The directors on a captured board, responsible for
oversight, are generally the officers themselves, individuals performing
various professional services for the corporation such as lawyers and in-
vestment bankers, and, finally, those with no real professional attachment
to the enterprise other than board membership." 4 The first two groups,
112. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
113. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCrURE OF THE CORPORATION § 11.1 (1976);
see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALl Corporate Governance
Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1058, 1058 n.127 (1993) (examining the shirking of
the duty to monitor management by "independent" directors who, because of composition
and constraints on time and information, simply "rubberstamp" management decisions);
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 873 ("All too often ... outside directors.., turn out
to be more independent of shareholders than they are of management.").
114. The first two groups of directors-the corporate officers and those who perform
services for the corporation-are respectively known as "inside" directors and inside
"outside" directors. Alternatively, those directors with no connection to the corporation
other than board membership are known as "outside" directors. See Avery S. Cohen, The
Outside Director-Selection, Responsibilities, and Contribution to the Public Corporation,
34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 837, 837 (1977) (classifying directors as "inside directors," "non-
independent outside directors," and "independent outside directors"); see also WILLIAM L.
CAREY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 156-57
(concise 6th ed. 1988) (noting that inside directors and outside directors who perform serv-
ices for the corporation are unable to exercise independent oversight because they have
strong professional and economic ties to the corporation and are therefore likely to acqui-
esce to the decisions of the chief executive); Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 1059 (question-
ing the independence of outside directors); CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, supra note
10, at 131 (comments of Ralph V. Whitworth, proposing that if one wants truly independ-
ent directors then the question should be how they obtained their position on the board
and not whether they worked for the corporation). But see ALI, supra note 82, § 1.34
(abandoning the use of labels, but stating that a director has a "significant relationship"
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because of their employment or financial relationship to management,
may find it difficult to exercise independent oversight. The third group
will rarely challenge management prerogative either, although there have
been recent exceptions.115 Such board members are usually selected
either by the chairman or other senior management, and they possess
extensive professional and personal ties to the officers that compromise
their effectiveness as monitors." 6 These directors are often officers of
other public corporations"17 and frequently ask their counterparts, whom
with a corporation's senior executives when, among other things, he is employed by the
corporation, a member of the immediate family of an officer, or affiliated in a professional
capacity with a law firm that is the primary legal advisor to the corporation).
115. Recently, outside directors have become emboldened and have challenged man-
agement in several notable cases. For example, in October 1992, the outside directors of
General Motors ousted their CEO Robert Stempel in response to the company's lackluster
performance. Paul Ingrassia, Board Reform Replaces the LBO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1992,
at A14. Similarly, James D. Robinson, I11, was removed from his position as chief execu-
tive of American Express in a move orchestrated by outside directors in January 1993.
Chief executives at Westinghouse and IBM met similar fates as a result of director revolts
led by outside directors, many of whom were former CEOs. See Julie A. Lopez, Manage-
ment: CEOs Find That Closest Chums on Board Are the Ones Most Likely to Plot a Revolt,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1993, at B1; see also Eben Shapiro, Philip Morris CEO Resigns
Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at A3 (examining the resignation of Philip
Morris CEO Michael A. Miles in the wake of the company's loss of more than $30 billion
in stock market value in two years and mounting criticism of his leadership from the board
and institutional investors); Thomas A. Stewart, The King is Dead, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993,
at 34 (discussing the recent firings and forced resignations of CEOs at several of the na-
tion's largest corporations).
While these cases demonstrate a board's ability to dispose of an ineffective chief execu-
tive, some commentators argue that such board action occurs too infrequently and often
only after serious damage to the corporation:
Cases like RJR-Nabisco, General Motors, and American Express, among
others, show us that if the situation gets bad enough, directors will do the
right thing. However, they also show us that current board structures impose
substantial obstacles to doing it sooner and more consistently. For example,
the financial press heralded the board of IBM for pushing out CEO John
Akers in January 1993. Yet this action took place after the company had lost
over $80 billion in market value in just a couple of years. Where was the
board during that period?
Nell Minow & Kit Bingham, The Ideal Board, CORP. BOARD, July-Aug. 1993, at 11; see also
Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance,
48 Bus. LAW. 59, 59 (1992) ("Directors eventually may act ... but their actions are often
late, after the shareholders have lost value, employees jobs, and the corporation its com-
petitive market position.").
116. See DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 98 (1993) (arguing that the selection of
new directors is frequently dominated by senior executives); CAREY & EISENBERG, supra
note 114, at 157; GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 224-30 (1991) (discussing
factors that lead to ineffective compensation committees); EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPO-
RATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 31 (1981) (discussing the "transitory" and
"guestlike" nature of an outside directorship); MONKS & MINOW, supra note 5, at 77-79
(1991) (stating that many directors are picked, not for their business acumen, but for their
"business or personal relationship[s]" with management); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
3, at 884 (noting that the way in which outside directors are selected leads to a lack of
incentive for corporate governance); Minow & Bingham, supra note 115, at 12 (comparing
shareholder elections of directors to elections held by the communist party of North Korea
in that management selects the candidates and counts the votes).
117. The most common selection for an outside director is the chief executive of an-
other corporation. JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES:
THE REALITIES OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 18 (1989) (noting that "63% of all
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they oversee, to serve as members of their own boards. Cross-director-
ships are not uncommon. 118 While such board composition may lead to
affable board gatherings, the oversight function may be severely compro-
mised. Board passivity in regard to management monitoring is the result
of this compositional structure. 119 Consequently, the outside directors
have little incentive to engage in effective management oversight other
than fiduciary duty, which has, given oversight-driven corporate disasters
of the last several years, proven ineffective in creating the necessary
incentive. 20
Board passivity is extraordinarily detrimental to the well-being of the
entire corporate enterprise. It robs the corporation and its owners, the
shareholders, of the necessary independent oversight, guidance, and rea-
soned control vital to the entity's health. Theoretically, under the tradi-
tional legal model, the board is responsible for the overall direction of the
enterprise. It should manage the corporation's business and set general
policy.12' Management is engaged to carry out that policy and operate
the company on a day-to-day basis. The board is expected to monitor
board members are CEOs of other corporations"); J. Spencer Letts, Corporate Govern-
ance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1515 (1980). "For a CEO, the most highly
coveted board members are CEOs of other companies. A startling two-thirds of all corpo-
rate directors are CEOs." CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, supra note 10, at 132 (com-
ments of Ralph V. Whitworth). "One wonders, however, if the person among all who is
most likely to be generally supportive of the chief executive isn't another chief executive."
Letts, supra, at 1515; see also Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collec-
tive Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 76 (1992) (discussing the lack
of impartiality of outside directors). Such directors are deemed to be "outside" directors
despite their close personal and professional ties to the executives of the company on
whose board they sit. For a definition of "outside directors," see supra note 114. However,
Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch would "not view as independent an executive of another
company on the board of which an executive of the company serves." Lipton & Lorsch,
supra note 115, at 67-68. Lipton and Lorsch propose that the exclusion of these otherwise
"outside" directors would lead to a more independent and active board. See id. at 68 n.32
(citing Kenneth A. Macke, The Board and Management: A New Partnership, DIRECrOR-
SHIP, July-Aug. 1992, at 8 ("The composition of the board is critical to how well it func-
tions. We like to make sure that everything is geared toward making the board as
independent and active as possible.")).
118. Barris, supra note 117, at 76, 78 n.113. A recent study of 788 of the nation's largest
public companies conducted by Directorship, a consulting firm located in Westport, Con-
necticut, found that in 39 of the companies surveyed, the leaders of those businesses served
on one another's boards in a "cross-directorship" phenomenon. The study further detailed
that in five of those companies, the cross-directorships involved the board's compensation
committees. Alison L. Cowan, Board Room Back-Scratching?, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1992,
at C1. The five compensation committee cross-directorships were B.F. Goodrich Co. and
Kroger Co.; Conagra, Inc. and Valmont Industries, Inc.; Kellogg Co. and Upjohn Co.; So-
noco Products Co. and NationsBank Corp.; and Allergan, Inc. and Beckman Instruments,
Inc. Id. In order to be truly independent, The National Association of Corporate Direc-
tors' Blue Ribbon Commission on Executive Compensation recommends that compensa-
tion committees exclude "any interlocking directorates, particularly among CEOs." Joann
S. Lublin, Panel Adopts a Tough Line on CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1993, at B1; see
also HERMAN, supra note 116, at 43 (suggesting that the cross-directorships are the result
of the directors' trusting each other to be truly "outside" directors).
119. See Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 659 n.19.
120. Id. at 659.
121. See CAREY & EISENBERG, supra note 114, at 154-57. The American Law Institute
has established general duties for boards of directors:
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continually corporate performance and management effectiveness in
maintaining optimal business operation and carrying out board policy.12 2
If management performs substandardly, the board, as an effective moni-
tor, must either provide executives with new direction or replace them.
The active monitoring role of the board of directors is not only central
to the traditional legal model of the corporation, but critical to ensuring
the success of the enterprise. Management operates; boards monitor.
When the monitoring function of the board becomes compromised for
any reason, the corporation may be destined for disaster.123 The benefits
to be achieved by effective board supervision of management are obvi-
ous. Thoughtful, judicious management is encouraged; unnecessarily
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where appropri-
ate, replace the principal senior executives;
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business to evaluate whether
the business is being properly managed;
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the corporation's financial
objectives and major corporate plans and actions;
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major changes in, the determi-
nations of other major questions of choice respecting, the appropriate audit-
ing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the preparation of
the corporation's financial statements; [and]
(5) Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or assigned to the
board under a standard of the corporation.
ALl, supra note 82, at § 3.02(a); see also LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 114, at 8-12(examining the historical concept of the burden of proof); MONKS & MINOW, supra note 5,
at 182-84 (examining the board of directors' duties).
However, in reality, the traditional legal model of the corporation serves only as a start-
ing point for the study of corporate structure and governance. "It has become increasingly
clear that in practice the board rarely performs either the management or policymaking
functions." CAREY & EISENBERG, supra note 114, at 155. Consequently, most of the power
supposedly vested in the board is actually held and exercised by management. Id. at 156.
Discussing this current view of the board's role, Chancellor William Allen of the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery stated:
The conventional perception is that boards should select senior management,
create incentive compensation schemes and then step back and watch the
organization prosper. In addition, board members should be available to act
as advisors to the CEO when called upon and they should be prepared to act
during a crisis.
Chancellor William T. Allen, Address at the Ray Garret, Jr., Corporate & Securities Law
Institute, Northwestern University, Chicago (Apr. 1992), in Lipton & Lorsch, supra note
115, at 62.
122. See CAREY & EISENBERG, supra note 114, at 154-57. "[T]he board of directors is
the linchpin of our system of corporate governance, and the foundation for the legitimacy
of actions taken by management in the name of the shareholders." SEC Chairman Rich-
ard Breeden, Address at the Town Hall of California (June 1992), in Lipton & Lorsch,
supra note 115, at 62. Actively monitoring corporate performance and management in an
informed manner is foremost among the responsibilities of the board of directors.
Outside directors should function as active monitors of corporate manage-
ment, not just in crisis, but continually; they should have an active role in the
formulation of the long-term strategic, financial, and organizational goals of
the corporation and should approve plans to achieve these goals; they should
as well engage in the periodic review of short and long-term performance
according to plan and be prepared to press for correction when in their judg-
ment there is need.
Allen, supra note 121.
123. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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risky or imprudent behavior is discouraged. 124 The potentially dilatory
impact of the unproductive, foolish, or felonious is lessened by a vigilant
board. On the other hand, the pernicious impact of the absence of active
board oversight is equally obvious. Without effective board monitoring,
the corporation becomes, in effect, a runaway stagecoach likely to do
greater damage to those within and to its owners who watch in horror
from the sidelines.
The primary consequences of board passivity created by management
capture is decreased management monitoring. But why does manage-
ment control over board appointments necessarily create board passivity?
Why would nonmanagement, outside directors on such captured boards,
be unwilling to challenge management prerogative and engage in active
oversight? There are three problems with a management-appointed
board that lead to ineffective oversight. First, personal and psychic ties to
the individuals who are responsible for one's appointment to a board
make it difficult to engage in necessary confrontation. It is always tough
to challenge a friend, particularly when the challenging party may one
day, as an officer of another enterprise, end up in the same position. Sec-
124. The board's preeminent duty is to monitor management and "prevent crisis." Mi-
now & Bingham, supra note 115, at 15. "The board's most important function is to ask
tough questions, listen to responses from management, and work together to find the right
answers." Id. at 11. If directors perform their monitoring function, "they may prevent a
significant portion of the long-term erosion of corporate performance that has plagued
many once successful U.S. corporations." Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 115, at 62.
In order to fulfill this monitoring obligation, boards must be comprised of individuals
with "the financial and strategic expertise and time to do the job." Robert A.G. Monks, To
Change the Company, Change the Board, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1993, at A20. In short, the
keystone of a vital public corporation must be a "reformed and revitalized [board] of direc-
tors willing to monitor management and capable of mustering the courage and will to con-
duct themselves with a fiduciary conscience." Johnson, supra note 6, at 55. In order to
effectuate the establishment of independent boards of directors, Elmer Johnson, a former
General Motors Board member, has suggested removing retired CEOs from the boards of
their former companies, limiting the size of boards to as few as seven directors, requiring
directors to own a "significant" number of the company's shares, and compensating man-
agement with shares of the corporation's stock. Id. at 54-55. As Johnson puts it, "Patient
capital is the foundation on which long-lived, wealth-creating institutions rest. But since
patient capital is helpless capital unless it has a voice, its prerequisite is a properly function-
ing board of directors." Id. at 46; see also Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 115, at 62 (quoting
Chancellor Allen, who stated that the board's "most basic responsibility [is] the duty to
monitor the performance of senior management in an informed way"); The Working
Group on Corporate Governance, A New Compact for Owners and Directors, 69 HARV.
Bus. REv. 141, 142 (1991) (suggesting that "outside" directors should evaluate the per-
formance of the chief executive regularly against established goals and strategies).
Professor Cox notes that empirical evidence demonstrates that outside directors may
"help to shield the corporation from managers' self-dealing or overreaching conduct."
James D. Cox, The ALL, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside
Director's Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1233, 1234, 1242 (1993). Examining the relation-
ship between board compensation and the termination of poorly performing management,
Cox points to data that show that the "likelihood that a board will terminate an un-
derperforming executive increases as the board's overall size increases" and continues to
increase with the proportion of outside directors. Id. at 1241 (citing Donald L. Helmich,
Organizational Growth and Succession Patterns, 17 ACAD. MGMT. J. 771, 774 (1974));
Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (1988);
Joann S. Lublin, More Chief Executives Are Being Forced Out by Tougher Boards, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 1991, at Al.
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ond, conflict with a manager who is also a member of one's own board
may lead to future retribution on one's own turf, thus reducing the incen-
tive to act. Third, and most important, when one owes one's own board
position to the largesse of management, any action taken that is inimical
to management may result in a failure to be renominated to the board,
which-given the large fees paid to directors (and the great reputational
advantage of board membership)-may function as an effective club to
stifle dissension. This is why the development of substantial director
compensation, a consequence of management control, has acted to stifle
board oversight of management and has, in fact, enhanced management
domination. But it is not the fact of compensation in and of itself that
created the problem, it is the form that compensation now takes.
Today's director compensation with its emphasis on substantial cash
payments and employee-type benefits, including insurance and retire-
ment programs, acts to align the interests of the outside directors with
current management rather than with the shareholders, making necessary
management oversight an almost impossible task. Why? Because the
outside directors are compensated in a way that makes them, in effect,
salaried employees of the corporation-or, in reality, the management-
rather than the representatives and fiduciaries of the corporation's own-
ers, the stockholders. Most board members receive substantial annual
salaries for their services and large fees based simply on meeting attend-
ance. Even though part-timers, they are entitled to the kinds of benefit
programs rank-employees receive, including insurance programs and gen-
erous pensions upon retirement. Pensions are particularly problematic
because they reward board longevity, controlled by management, rather
than the quality of service. The message of this benefit to the director
would seem to be not to rock the boat, so as to remain aboard long
enough to be entitled to his or her pension-a great reward for what is
essentially part-time employment. 125
This situation is only made worse by the prevalent use of director con-
sulting and employment arrangements, and charitable contribution pro-
grams whereby the company makes substantial donations to the
director's favorite charity, both of which are created and administered by
management.126 They serve no real purpose other than to further link
the directors' fortunes to management, rather than the company's overall
125. See Lublin, supra note 12, at B1; Joann S. Lublin, Management: More Big Compa-
nies Reconsider Lavish Pensions for Directors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at B1 [hereinaf-
ter Lublin, Management]. Many "[c]ritics contend that lucrative pensions unduly enrich
outside directors, encourage them to stay too long and affect their ability to be independ-
ent." Lublin, Management, supra, at B1; NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 16-18; Carey et
al., supra note 1, at 10.
126. Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, supra note 2, at 170. Directors may either be
employed directly by the company as consultants for "special" projects or find that their




productivity.'2 7 It is management who decides who gets to consult and
for how much, and it is management who decides how much to give to the
director's charity of choice and when to give it. These arrangements seem
to function more as side-bribes than legitimate furtherances of the corpo-
rate purpose. Appointed to the board by management, subject to easy
termination because of management control of the proxy process, 2 8 and
compensated in a manner determined by, or at the least, under the influ-
ence of management, the outside director has become a mere retainer
rather than watchful fiduciary.
It has been argued that these special forms of director compensation
are necessary to retain the services of the highest caliber individuals.129
Perhaps, but they also have certainly acted to compromise outside direc-
tor independence from management and further fueled the board passiv-
ity that has resulted in minimal management oversight and poor
corporate performance. 130 As noted, today's board compensation treats
the outside director as an employee of management, rather than a fiduci-
127. See NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at 16-18; G. Bruce Knecht & Joann S. Lublin,
American Express Bars Using Directors As Paid Consultants, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at
A3.
128. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Carey et al., supra note 1, at 4.
130. It is illustrative to note the dramatic change in compensation practices that oc-
curred between 1979 and 1993 at the following U.S. corporations who experienced particu-
larly severe oversight driven difficulties in the last few years:
American Express
1979:
* $8000 annual fee, $400 per board meeting attended, and $300 per commit-
tee meeting attended.
* In addition, chairs of the Compensation and Audit Committees received
an extra $2000 while all other chairs received an extra $1000. AMERICAN
EXPRESS CO., MAR. 21, 1979 PROXY STATEMENT (1979).
1993:
* $48,000 annual fee, but if attendance at board meetings was below 75%,
then only $36,000; no per meetings fees.
* In addition, all committee chairs received an extra $7500.
* Retirement Plan: After five years of service, 100% final annual fee paid
for the same number of years served or death, whichever is earlier. AMER-
ICAN EXPRESS CO., MAR. 12, 1993 PROXY STATEMENT 5-14, 16-23 (1993).
General Motors
1979:
* $15,000 annual fee plus $500 per board meeting attended with 12 board
meetings per year.
* In addition, members of the Finance Committee got an extra $12,000 and
the members of the Bonus/Salary, Audit, Public Policy, and Nominating
Committees got an extra $10,000. Committee chairs received an extra
$1000. GENERAL MOTORS, APR. 12, 1979 PROXY STATEMENT (1979).
1993:
* $22,000 annual fee plus $1000 per board meeting attended with 12 board
meetings per year.
* In addition, all committee members received an extra $12,000. GENERAL





ary of the shareholders. The outside board member's stake in the enter-
prise is not one reflecting the performance-based concerns of ownership,
but rather the interests of a highly salaried company employee. Directors
whose remuneration is unrelated to corporate performance have little
personal incentive to challenge their management benefactors. Eager not
to "bite the hand that feeds them," particularly when such an action may
lead to discharge from a lucrative position, it is little wonder that boards
have become so passive and subject to management domination. Direc-
tor compensation is clearly partly to blame for this phenomenon.
III. COMPENSATION AS THE CURE TO BOARD PASSIVITY
As board compensation practices may have acted to compound the
problem of board passivity, they may also form the basis for its solution.
To loosen management's grip on the board and stimulate real oversight,
* $15,000 annual fee plus $300 per board meeting attended with 11 board
meetings per year.
* In addition, Committee chairs received an extra $2000 per annum. INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., MAR. 21, 1979 PROXY STATEMENT
(1979).
1993:
* $55,000 annual fee; no per meeting fees with 13 board meetings per year.
* Committee chairs received an extra $5000 per annum.
* One hundred shares of stock per annum.
* Retirement Plan: After five years of service, 50% of last annual retainer
paid for life. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., MAR. 15, 1993
PROXY STATEMENT 10-19 (1993).
Morrison-Knudsen
1979:
* $8000 annual fee plus $1000 per board meeting attended with five board
meetings per year. MORRISON-KNUDSEN, MAR. 26, 1979 PROXY STATE-
MENT (1979).
1993:
* $20,000 annual fee plus $1000 per day for board meetings and $500 per
committee meetings with four board meetings per year.
* Committee chairs received extra $3000 per annum.
* Retirement Plan: At age of 55+ with at least five years of service or at any
age with at least 15 years of service, 100% of last annual compensation




* $12,000 annual fee plus $500 per board meeting attended with 11 board
meetings per year.
* Executive Committee members received an extra $2000 per annum and
any committee chair received an extra $1000 per annum. WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC CORP., Mar. 2, 1979 PROXY STATEMENT (1979).
1993:
* $22,000 annual fee plus $1200 per board meeting attended with 12 board
meetings per year.
* Committee chairs received an extra $2000 per annum.
* Retirement Plan: After five years of service, 100% of last annual retainer
paid for as many years served up to 10 with payments starting at age 70.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., Mar. 8, 1993 PROXY STATEMENT (1993).
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an appeal must be made to that same sense of director self-interest that
created the problem in the first place. There is nothing inherently wrong
with a management-appointed board. 131 The problem arises when a
management-sponsored director fails to exercise appropriate oversight
because of loyalty to the appointing party. The outside directors must be
motivated to view management not from the perspective of a loyal em-
ployee fearful of discharge, but from the viewpoint of an owner, con-
cerned with overall corporate profitability. How can this be
accomplished? To ensure that directors will examine executive initiatives
in the best interest of the business, the outside directors must become
substantial shareholders. To facilitate this, directors' fees should be paid
primarily in company stock that is restricted as to resale during their term
in office. No other form of compensation, which serves to compromise
their independence from management, should be permitted. The goal is
to create within each director a personally based motivation to actively
monitor management in the best interest of corporate productivity and to
counteract the oversight-inhibiting environment that management ap-
pointment and cash-based/benefit-laden fees create. 132
Equity ownership would counter the pressures placed on outside direc-
tors because of management appointment and domination. It is very
hard to resist the demands of individuals to whom one owes one's posi-
tion when one's involvement in the venture is limited to the fee one re-
ceives for one's service, and the continuance of that fee is subject to the
will of management. Possessing an actual, substantial stake in the venture
itself considerably alters the nature of this relationship. In addition to
considering that the active monitoring of management may lead to re-
placement, an outside director must also consider that the failure to exer-
131. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 665-67.
132. The salutary effects of directors' ownership of a substantial amount of stock have
been well documented. See, e.g., MACE, supra note 10, at 61-65 (noting that outside direc-
tors who own substantial amounts of stock in their companies are more likely to ask dis-
cerning questions than their nonstockholding counterparts); Elson, Board Pay Affects
Executive Pay, supra note 1, at 7-11 (stating that directors with substantial equity in compa-
nies are more inclined to keep pay tied to performance); James J. Fitzsimmons, A Better
Approach to Director Pay, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1992, at 48, 49-50 (concluding
that directors paid in stock are more closely aligned with shareholders and in a better
position to ensure that management is paid based upon performance); Edmund W. Little-
field, A Stake with Restricted Stock, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1985, at 51, 52 (stating
that "[p]aying directors in meaningful amounts of restricted stock gives them a common
stake with the shareholders"); Joann S. Lublin, Director's Cut, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994,
at R5 (stating that companies are increasingly turning to stock options as compensation for
outside directors); David J. McLaughlin, The Director's Stake in the Enterprise, DIRECTORS
& BOARDS, Winter 1994, at 53-59 (studying the relationship between outside director stock
ownership and corporate performance); Pearl Meyer, The Rise of the Outside Director as
an Equity Owner, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1986, at 41 (observing that, historically,
directors owned a large amount of stock and that they may be returning to this compensa-
tion scheme); Robert Stobaugh, Director Compensation: A Lever to Improve Corporate
Governance, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Aug. 1993, at 1-4 (comparing the performance of
companies with a high degree of stock ownership by its directors with companies whose
directors' stockholdings are relatively small). See generally Elson, Board-Based Solution,
supra note 1, at 981-96 (stating that the key to independent and dutiful outside directors is
not simply stock ownership, but substantial stock ownership).
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cise effective oversight may result in the diminution of his or her personal
wealth. Under such an arrangement, it would not be so easy to acquiesce
to the demands of management. This scheme creates a more balanced
relationship between management and equity-holding outside directors
and, in turn, encourages the kind of oversight presently lacking in the
traditional management-dominated board.
On June 19, 1995, in what commentators termed a major development
in American corporate governance, the National Association of Corpo-
rate Directors' Commission on Director Compensation released a report
calling for a radical overhaul of the compensation system for U.S. public
company directors. 133 Focusing on greater board equity ownership, the
Commission, comprised of prominent senior executives, academics,
shareholder activists, and compensation consultants,134 made a series of
recommendations designed to improve corporate performance by chang-
ing board pay practices to more closely align "the interests of sharehold-
ers and directors." 135 Finding that equity-holders function as better
directors, the panel called upon companies to do the following:
1. pay directors primarily in stock, with equity representing up to
one hundred percent of the total;
2. set a substantial stock ownership target and deadline for each
director;
3. abolish all benefits programs for board members, including
pension plans, because they "often reward longevity rather than
performance;' 36
4. ban outside directors or their firms from providing professional
or financial services to the company; and
5. fully disclose each director's pay and prerequisites in their
proxy statements. 137
133. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
134. Members of the Commission included: Robert Stobaugh (Professor, Harvard
Business School) (Commission Chair); William W. Adams (Former CEO, Armstrong
World Industries); Michael L. Davis (Principal, Towers Perrin); Albert J. Dunlap (Chair-
man & CEO, Scott Paper Co.); Charles M. Elson (Professor, Stetson University College of
Law); Edward H. Fleischman (Linklaters & Paines); Hon. Barbara Hackman Franklin
(Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce); James E. Heard (President, Institutional Share-
holder Services, Inc.); J.W. Lorsch (Senior Associate Dean, Harvard Business School);
William L. MacDonald (President & CEO, Compensation Resource Group, Inc.); James E.
Marley (Chairman, AMP Incorporated); Ira M. Millstein (Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal &
Manges); Nell Minow (Principal, Lens, Inc.); Robert K. Mueller (Director, Arthur D. Lit-
tle Ltd. (U.K.)); J.E. Richard (Senior Managing Partner, J. Richard & Co.); Jean Head
Sisco (Partner, Sisco Associates and Chairman, National Association of Corporate Direc-
tors); William R. Smart (Vice President, Cambridge Strategic Management Group); Ralph
V. Whitworth (President, Whitworth & Associates and Former President, United Share-
holders Association); Andrew R. Zaleta (Partner, The Heidrick Partners, Inc.); and John
M. Nash (President, National Association of Corporate Directors) (Ex Officio Member).
NACD REPORT, supra note 11, at iii.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at iii. The Commission recommended that in setting director compensation,
companies should adopt the following "Five Principals":




The Commission was particularly harsh in its criticism of the director
benefit programs that had proliferated throughout the 1980s. It argued
that these programs worked against the alignment of director and share-
holder interests, noting:
[B]y their very value, generous benefit programs may actually create
incentives for directors to oppose actions that could benefit share-
holders, if such actions would mean challenging management. This is
especially true when a term of service is required before the benefits
vest. In such cases, prior to vesting, directors have even more to lose
in a tussle. 138
Insofar as paying fees and retainers to directors for professional or finan-
cial services, the Commission strongly discouraged companies from en-
gaging in such practices:
Boards of directors should hire directors to be directors and service
providers to provide services. If the director's primary value to the
company is as a consultant or advisor, the individual should be
brought on as such and paid as such, not brought on as a director but
paid as a consultant. The director's role is distinct and separate from
that of a consultant; both roles can be severely compromised through
commingling. 139
But it was clear from comments made by panel members following the
report's release that the most significant (and controversial) result of the
group's efforts was its recommendations on director equity ownership
and compensation. According to Albert J. Dunlap, panel member and
chairman and chief executive officer of Scott Paper Co.:
What kind of contribution will the directors ever make if they don't
have a vested interest in the company's financial success? They've
2. Director compensation should be aligned with long-term interests of
shareholders.
3. Compensation should be used to motivate director behavior.
4. Directors should be adequately compensated for their time and effort.
5. Director compensation should be approached on an overall basis, rather
than as an array of separate elements.
Id. And based on these "Principals," the Commission recommended the following "Best
Practices":
1. Establish a process by which directors can determine the compensation
program in a deliberative and objective way.
2. Set a substantial target for stock ownership by each director and a time
period during which the target is to be met.
3. Define the desirable total value of all forms of director compensation.
4. Pay directors solely in the form of equity and cash-with equity represent-
ing a substantial portion of the total up to 100 percent; dismantle existing
benefit programs and avoid creating new ones.
5. Adopt a policy stating that a company should not hire a director or a
director's firm to provide professional or financial services to the
corporation.
6. Disclose fully in the proxy statement the philosophy and process used in
determining director compensation and the value of all elements of
compensation.
Id.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. at 18.
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got to show that they believe in the company, that they're willing to
stand behind their choices .... Any director who isn't willing to be
paid [one hundred] percent in stock doesn't believe in the
company. 140
The Commission's recommendations were in part based upon a grow-
ing body of empirical evidence that suggested that director stock owner-
ship resulted in more effective management oversight and hence better
corporate performance. In its report, the Commission cited a recent
study that I conducted which indicated that the greater the stockholdings
of the outside directors, the better the performance of the corporation.141
Annually, Fortune magazine conducts a survey to determine America's
most and least admired companies. 142 In 1992, the survey included 311
companies in 32 different industries. 143 To determine a company's rank-
ing, the survey examined such reputational attributes as long-term invest-
ment value, use of corporate assets, quality of management, and quality
of products or services. 144 Assuming that the companies most admired by
the corporate and financial communities were more effectively managed
and possessed better board monitoring than those that were not, this sur-
vey provided an excellent starting point for an examination of the link
between good corporate results and outside director stock ownership. Of
the 311 companies examined in the Fortune study, I reviewed 110 compa-
nies on either extreme of the survey-either receiving the highest or the
lowest ratings for overall admiration. I found that those companies with
superior reputations, and hence performance, were much more likely to
be run by boards with substantial shareholdings than those with poor rep-
utations and results, whose outside directors tended to hold little com-
pany stock. 145 Similar studies conducted by Professor Robert Stobaugh
of the Harvard Business School and David McLaughlin, a noted manage-
ment consultant, yielded essentially the same results. 146 In an earlier
140. ALBERT J. DUNLAP, MEAN BUSINESS 218 (1996).
141. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 700-06.
142. Jennifer Reese, America's Most Admired Corporations, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1993, at
44.
143. The 32 industries included the following: mining, crude-oil production; petroleum
refining; utilities; forest & paper products; pharmaceutical; chemicals; textiles; metals;
building materials; rubber and plastics products; metal products; electronics, electrical
equipment; computers, office equipment; scientific, photographic, and control equipment;
publishing, printing; apparel; soaps, cosmetics; retailing; furniture; diversified service; life
insurance; diversified financial; commercial banking; savings institutions; food; beverages;
tobacco; aerospace; motor vehicles and parts; industrial and farm equipment; transporta-
tion; and transportation equipment. Id.
144. The eight attributes included were the following: quality of management; financial
soundness; quality of products or services; ability to attract, develop, and keep talented
people; use of corporate assets; value as long term investment; innovativeness; and commu-
nity and environmental responsibility. Id. at 46.
145. Elson, Duty of Care, supra note 1, at 703-06.
146. Id. at 700-01. The first of these studies was conducted by Professor Robert
Stobaugh of the Harvard Business School. See Stobaugh, supra note 132, at 1-4. Stobaugh
found that compensating directors in stock resulted in improved corporate performance.
Id. at 4. The study examined and compared investors' returns from two groups of corpora-
tions. The first group was comprised of nine companies that "were corporate governance
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study on executive compensation, I found that companies the financial
community considered to have overpaid their executives were much more
likely to be controlled by boards with insubstantial equity holdings. Con-
versely, companies considered to have compensated their executives rea-
sonably were more often run by boards with substantial company
stockholdings.147 These studies suggested the existence of a causal link
between substantial stock ownership and effective management oversight
by the outside directors. An alignment of directors' interests with those
of the shareholders, rather than management, through the possession by
directors of large shareholding positions, would explain the phenomenon.
Even prior to the official release of the NACD Commission's report, it
appeared that the institutional investor community had taken a great in-
terest in the panel's proposals. In the 1995 proxy season, proposals relat-
ing to either ending director pensions or to creating director stock
compensation programs appeared on almost forty major public company
ballots, including IBM, B.F. Goodrich, GTE, and Philip Morris.148 They
received significant support, ranging from twenty to fifty percent of the
total vote cast.149
The financial press widely reported the Commission's findings, noting
that many U.S. companies were already voluntarily moving in the direc-
tion of the panel's recommendations.1 50 At the time of the report's issu-
ance, Scott Paper, Travelers Group, and Alexander & Alexander already
had adopted equity-based director compensation plans.15' In fact, Scott
Paper's stock jumped three percent in value on the date that its equity
plan was made public.152 IBM had announced that it was switching from
'targets' of at least three shareholder groups," and the second group consisted of the nine
highest ranked companies on the Fortune list of "most admired companies." Id. at 2. Pro-
fessor Stobaugh discovered that the average stockholding of the directors at the "most
admired" companies was much greater than that of the directors of the poorly performing
companies. Id. As a result of his study, Stobaugh concluded that there was an apparent
correlation between corporate performance and stockholding by members of the board of
directors. Id. at 2-3. Consequently, he recommended paying half of a director's annual
compensation in company stock until "stock ownership by corporate directors ... in-
creased to a level at which the value of the director's stock ownership is perhaps ten times
the director's annual compensation." Id. at 4.
David J. McLaughlin, the president of a Connecticut management consulting firm, con-
ducted the second of these studies. See McLaughlin, supra note 132, at 53-59. McLaugh-
lin's study examined the stock holdings of outside directors at 70 companies, comparing the
performance of the director stock ownership. Id. at 54. The study found that the compa-
nies with the highest degree of director stock ownership "delivered a return of 174% to
their shareholders over five years from 1988 to 1992, while those with the lowest delivered
only a 73% return." Id.
147. Elson, Board-Based Solution, supra note 1, at 990-95.
148. Lublin, supra note 12, at Bi; 1995 Shareholder Proposals Checklist, supra note 17,
at 21-22.
149. 1995 Shareholder Proposals Checklist, supra note 17, at 21-22.
150. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
151. Lublin, supra note 12, at B1; John A. Byrne, How Much Should it Take to Keep the
Board on Board?, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 1995, at 41; Glenn Collins, Scott Paper to Pay Direc-
tors Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at D3.
152. Collins, supra note 151, at B3. See Jacqueline M. Graves, While Directors Get
Stock, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 18.
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a primarily cash-based to a fifty percent equity, fifty percent cash director
compensation package and that it was scaling back its board pension pro-
gram. 153 American Express and W.R. Grace agreed to eliminate director
consulting arrangements. 154 Additionally, shortly after the Commission's
findings were issued, the Securities and Exchange Commission an-
nounced proposed rule changes to expand public disclosure of board
compensation, which appeared in line with the Commission's
recommendations.155
In the year following the NACD Commission's report, the number of
companies adopting the Commission's recommendations on director
stock ownership and elimination of director pensions grew dramatically
to include some of the nation's largest and most respected corporate insti-
tutions.156 That trend accelerated considerably with the approach of the
1996 proxy season as the Investor Rights Association of America
(IRAA), a small-shareholder advocacy group, announced that it was pro-
posing over 120 shareholder resolutions calling for the elimination of di-
rector pension plans and the adoption of outside director stock-based
153. Lublin, supra note 12, at B1; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., MARCH
14, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 5 (1995) [hereinafter IBM 1995 PROXY].
154. Knecht & Lublin, supra note 127, at A3.
155. See infra Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 33-7184 6-7 (June 27,
1995).
156. The companies adopting equity-based director compensation plans as of April 30,
1996, were as follows: Alexander & Alexander; Angelica; American Express; AMP;
Archer-Daniels-Midland; Armstrong World Industries; Asarco; Bankers Trust; Bausch &
Lomb; Baxter International; CSX; Campbell Soup; Chase Manhattan; Chrysler; Digital
Equipment; Eastman Kodak; El Paso Natural Gas; Estee Lauder; Florida Progress; Gil-
lette; IBM; ITT; James River; Kaufman & Broad; Kellogg; McGraw-Hill; May Department
Stores; Melville; NationsBank; NYNEX; Occidental Petroleum; Philip Morris; Phillips Pe-
troleum; Sara Lee; Scott Paper; Texas Instruments; Time/Warner; Travelers Group; Union
Pacific; United Technologies; Westinghouse Electric; Woolworth; and Yellow Corp. Elson,
Major Shifts Seen in Director Pay, supra note 1, at 3; Lyons, supra note 15, at 4; 1995
BOARD INDEX, supra note 11, at 38-43; IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN,
April-June, 1996, at 8, 9.
The companies eliminating director pension programs as of April 30, 1996, were as fol-
lows: Aetna Life and Casualty; Alexander & Alexander; Allstate; ALCOA; American
Express; AMP Inc.; AMR; Anheuser-Busch; Archer-Daniels-Midland; Armco; Armstrong
World Industries; Asarco; B.F. Goodrich; BankAmerica; Bay View Capital; Baxter Inter-
national; Bell Atlantic; Bristol-Myers Squibb; Brunswick; Burlington Resources; Campbell
Soup Company; Ceridian Corp.; Chase Manhattan; Chrysler; Columbia Gas; Cooper In-
dustries; Colgate-Palmolive Co.; Cray Research; Dexter Corp.; Digital Equipment; Domin-
ion Resources; Dover; Eastern Enterprises; Eaton Corp.; Eli Lilly; First Chicago; General
Motors; Goodyear; Household International; IBM; Illinois Tool Works; Inland Steel; Inter-
national Paper; Interpublic Group; ITT; James River; Johnson & Johnson; Kaufman &
Board; Kellogg; Kmart; May Department Stores; McDonalds; McGraw-Hill; Mead Corp.;
Melville; Merck; MidAmerican Energy Corp.; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing; Mo-
torola; NationsBank; Nicor; Norfolk Southern; NYNEX; NYSEG; Oryx Energy; Pacific-
Telesis; Pfizer; Philip Morris; Pittston Brinks; Public Service Enterprise; Rockwell Interna-
tional; Sears Roebuck; Southern New England Tel.; Sun Co.; Tambrands Inc.; Tenneco;
Texaco; Texas Instruments; Time/Warner; USAir; Union Pacific; Upjohn Corp.; United
Technologies; Variety; Warner-Lambert; Wells Fargo & Co.; Westinghouse Electric Corp.;
Woolworth; and Xerox. Elson, Major Shifts Seen in Director Pay, supra note 1, at 3.
The above listings are not exclusive as many corporations have approved or are in the
process of approving such governance changes, but have not yet publicly announced their
action.
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compensation. 157 With widespread coverage of the IRAA's efforts by the
national financial press and given the group's success in the previous year
in attracting substantial shareholder support for their efforts, 58 a number
of companies voluntarily adopted the director compensation changes re-
quested by the organization in exchange for the withdrawal of their
shareholder proposals. 159 As Thomas Flanagan, president of the IRAA
stated, "[d]irectors become better fiduciaries of shareholders if they are
shareholders themselves.' 160
Several large companies announced that they would be complying with
some or even all of the NACD Commission's recommendations without
IRAA involvement. AMP Inc., Armstrong World Industries, Brunswick
Corp., and ITT, for example, all agreed to take such steps without direct
pressure from investors.' 6' In fact, Campbell Soup announced in its 1995
Proxy Statement that its board of directors had fully endorsed all of the
"Best Practices" recommended by the Commission.162
The companies adopting stock-based director compensation have not
settled on a single approach to the issue. Some have replaced all forms of
cash compensation with simple stock grants.163 Others have blended
stock and cash in a range from fifty percent stock, fifty percent cash' 64 to
seventy-five percent stock, twenty-five percent cash. 165 The form of eq-
uity granted has also varied. While many simply have given their direc-
tors restricted stock, others have developed option schemes, deferred
stock grants, or even phantom stock payments.166 Much more common,
however, is the simple payment of the fee in stock that is restricted as to
157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See 1995 BOARD INDEX, supra note 11,
at 38-43.
158. A shareholder resolution proposing the elimination of director pensions received
48.7% of the votes at B.F. Goodrich. Lublin, Management, supra note 125, at B1. See also
1995 Shareholder Proposals Checklist, supra note 17, at 21-22 (stating that the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) reported the following selected voting results on
1995 shareholder proposals to restrict nonemployee director pensions: Baltimore Gas &
Electric (36%); Chase Manhattan (27.2%); Dime Bancorp (40.7%); EG & G (40.8%);
GTE (33.2%); IBM (26.0%); Merck (25.8%); NYNEX (29.4%); Pacific Telesis Group
(30.2%); Philip Morris (24.6%); and Warner-Lambert (29.5%)).
159. Westinghouse Electric, Kaufman & Broad, NYNEX, Anheuser-Busch, and Sun
Co., among other companies, agreed to change their director compensation policies appar-
ently in exchange for the withdrawal of the IRAA's resolutions prior to their annual meet-
ings. Lublin, supra note 16, at A4; Selz, supra note 16, at B2; see Decker, supra note 16, at
6.
160. Selz, supra note 16, at B2; see also Thomas E. Flanagan, Director's Pensions-One
Shareholder's View, in DIRECTORSHIP-SIGNIFICANT ISSUES FACING DIRECTORS, 8-4, 8-4
to 8-5 (1996).
161. Lublin, Management, supra note 125, at B1; Lublin, supra note 16, at A4;
Auerbach, supra note 15, at R6.
162. CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY, OCT. 6, 1995 PROXY STATEMENT 20 (1995).
163. An example is Scott Paper Company. Scott Paper Board to Be Compensated
Solely in Company Stock, ScoTr NEWS, Aug. 30, 1994, at 1; Collins, supra note 151, at B3.
164. For example, IBM. IBM 1995 PROXY, supra note 153, at 5.
165. An example is Florida Progress. FLORIDA PROGRESS FEB. 29, 1996 PROXY STATE-
MENT 11-12 (1996).
166. See Elson, Major Shifts Seen in Director Pay, supra note 1, at 3; Carey et al., supra
note 1, at 12; Lyons, supra note 15, at 1, 4.
SMU LAW REVIEW
resale during the director's term in office. These differences in the
mechanics of equity delivery do not reflect any substantive concern with
equity in general, but appear to be purely taxation-driven. Individual
boards may have varying financial circumstances that require customized
equity programs to produce the best possible returns for the recipients
from a taxation standpoint.167
Regardless of the form that the equity payments to directors have been
taking, what has been particularly striking is the sheer number of compa-
nies shifting compensation from cash to equity and eliminating director
pension programs. Ann Mule, corporate secretary of Sun Co., the Phila-
delphia oil refiner, upon announcing Sun's change in board compensation
policy, stated that the company's action "'accomplishes the goal of more
closely aligning director compensation to the long-term interest of share-
holders,""' 68 a sentiment with which much of corporate America, through
its latest actions, seems to be in agreement. If current trends continue,
within a year, equity-based director compensation will have become the
norm for most of America's largest corporations.
This dramatic shift in director compensation practice is a watershed
development and represents the beginning of a sea change in American
corporate governance. For many years, the board passivity occasioned by
management appointment and capture has resulted in lax management
oversight and decreased corporate productivity. Equity-based director
compensation will create a tremendous counter-weight to this problem
and energize previously complacent outside directors. The empirical data
demonstrating heightened corporate performance and more reasonable
executive compensation in tandem with substantial outside director eq-
uity holdings suggests a link between stock ownership and improved
management monitoring by the board. If, by altering director compensa-
tion practice, director stock ownership can be increased and financial
links to management decreased, then significantly improved board over-
sight will result. A director's stake in the enterprise will no longer reflect
the fee-based interests of a management retainee, but will reflect the per-
formance-based concerns of ownership. As one prominent corporate
critic and former CEO noted upon his company's adoption of an equity-
based compensation plan, "[O]ur shareholders loved it because the board
members began thinking like shareholders. They were no longer just
picking up a check at the end of a meeting."'1 69
This shift to equity-based director compensation promises to funda-
mentally alter a decades-old norm of American corporate governance:
the separation of ownership and control. By placing, through changes in
167. Id.
168. Selz, supra note 16, at B2.
169. Dunlap, supra note 140, at 219. Indeed, William Steiner, founder of the IRAA, in
commenting on his organization's shareholder proposal efforts, noted, "'What we try to do
is to get companies to pay their outside directors at least 50[%] in stock.... Tying directors
much more directly to the fortunes of outside shareholders has real merit."' Decker, supra
note 16, at 6.
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compensation practice, substantial equity in the hands of management-
appointed directors, we may return the board to its original role as own-
ers, representing other owners, overseeing corporate performance. In so
doing, we will have at last reunited ownership with control and replaced
board passivity with truly effective oversight and heightened corporate
performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, corporate boards were comprised of major stockholders
who represented the interests of their fellow owners in overseeing the-
operation of the enterprise. But with the rise of the large-scale public
corporation, with its attendant dispersed shareholdings, professional
managers took control of their operations and replaced owner-directors
with board members of their own choosing. The new breed of director
had little connection with the enterprise other than their relationship with
the appointing management, and it was soon recognized that these indi-
viduals needed to be compensated for their efforts-hence the develop-
ment of regular director compensation.
As largely appointees of management and subject to management ap-
proval in relation to retention, the directors' interests become more
aligned with the group that selected and retained them than with the
shareholders. Boards became captives of management and this was the
real origin of the board passivity vis-A-vis management oversight that we
grapple with today. If a director owed his or her position to management
largesse and that position entailed considerable compensation and pres-
tige, the director had little personal incentive to challenge the appointing
party. This trend became increasingly more pronounced throughout the
1980s with changes in board compensation practices that came to include
substantial cash payments and extraordinarily generous benefit programs.
Director compensation, originally resulting from management control,
had become instrumental in its very maintenance and further fueled
board passivity that resulted in minimal management oversight and poor
corporate performance.
However, as compensation practices may have acted to compound the
problem of board passivity, they may also form the basis for its solution.
By altering the compensation format to include primarily equity, we will
make directors substantial stockholders and create within each board
member a personally based motivation to actively monitor management
in the best interest of corporate productivity and to counteract the over-
sight-inhibiting environment that management appointment and cash-
based fees create. This is why the current corporate movement towards
equity-based compensation is of such significance. While director com-
pensation was an outgrowth of the separation of ownership and control, it
may also result in their reunification. By changing the form of compensa-
tion to include primarily equity, we will make the directors owners of the
corporation once again and perhaps have finally found the solution to the
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conundrum Berle and Means identified many decades ago. With board
control back in the hands of owner-directors, boards should become more
active management monitors and the oversight-driven problems resulting
from board passivity will become much less prevalent. A quiet revolution
has begun. Reformulating board compensation to focus on stock-based
pay will energize previously passive boards and create the effective over-
sight and performance that shareholders and the American public
demand.
